my journal 3

Damn, is this good. I am "attending" a class at Yale (!) about the subject I wanted to get acquainted with:
Financial Markets Online Course, Yale Economics, Robert Shiller | Free Video lectures, Download

This is awesome. It's pressure-free learning. No pressure from the professor, no worries about homework, exams, grades, schedule, roommates, housemates, university fees. I get the top intelligence for free and without annoyances. And also: no worries about having to take all the other classes, with the various "requirements", and having to cover subjects superficially because of having to do too many things at once... nothing negative, all positive - just learning in its purest state. I am definitely going to enjoy this.

Thank you so much, Yale and professor Shiller. I never thought I'd ever say this about any lecture by any professor. And this guy is particularly good at explaining things.
 
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got started on bernoulli

Ok, I got started on the next feat (simultaneous feat with the Shiller class feat): reading Bernoulli's Exposition of a New Theory on the Measurement of Risk.

It did take me one hour to figure out the first sentence, but at least I am doing things right:
View attachment reading_bernoullis_mensura_sortis.xls

At the beginning of the paper, it seems that "risk" (I don't have the original) is the (wrong) translation chosen for "sors" (sors, sortis) "luck", and that doesn't seem right, but the fact is that it was "wrong" for Bernoulli to have to write the paper in a dead language to begin with. Indeed "sors" is actually closer to "fortune" and "luck". This is due to the fact that the Romans did not have a concept such as "risk" and "probability" - so really, **** that misleading translation and **** using a dead language where you cannot add new words. Just yesterday I was hearing the lecture from Shiller who said that "probability" was a concept invented (or at least publicized) only in the 17th century, so they definitely should not have a word for "probability" in Latin. But they have "luck", which is "sors". So the translator uses "probability" and "risk" are used as synonyms for "luck" and "fortune". Even in Italian and Spanish we have similar words, "sorte" and "suerte".

Basically, I am kind of pissed off to have to read the translation in English of a scientific paper written by a German in a dead language, Latin. On top of everything, I am Italian and almost math illiterate, so it is kind of frustrating. So there's too many translations going on at once.

In the meanwhile the GBL is going all over the place:
Eurex - Fixed Income Derivatives

Snap1.jpg

I hope this is the beginning of a reversal and that now it will fall.

My future depends on this mother ****er:

12.jpg

I messed things up again and if it doesn't fall i am screwed. It's gone up to 140.20sh yesterday, too, and so far things look ok, but I also want it to hurry up and fall.

[...]

Great. Everyone keeps on confirming to me that the material I am covering is dead on target: now Shiller is talking about Expected Value (which is what I came across on Bernoulli's paper, cfr. attachment):
2. The Universal Principle of Risk Management: Pooling and the Hedging of Risks - YouTube
 
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"Never again!"...

Ah ah, this is comical.

I've just felt like saying "never again" for the umpteenth time. Ok, so basically I've made those two famous trades on QG and GBL, and first of all I haven't made any money on them, and so that is the first problem. The second problem is that they kept my margin busy for the past two weeks.

And they're still threatening me with losses, so I can't even sleep at night because of them. And they were supposed to be risk-free trades... I really suck.

Henry Hub Natural Gas
Snap1.jpg

Eurex - Fixed Income Derivatives
Snap2.jpg

It seems that I won't have peace until I'll blow out my account. If things are going ok, I place discretionary trades. It really seems that I do not want to make any money. Or that I want it to make it too badly.
 
Understanding Bond Prices and Interest Rates

Being my trading entirely based on technical analysis, I didn't even give much thought to what I am actually trading. But now that my trade is going against me, I felt the urge to learn something about how the Bund moves and I found this link:
ECB: Key interest rates

and this, which is the first thing I ever found written clearly and in simple words:
Bonds and Interest Rates - Bond Prices Move Inversely to Interest Rates

I'm gonna quote something from the last link:
The biggest economic threat to bonds is rising interest rates. If you own a bond and interest rates go up, the value of your bond on the open market, with few exceptions, will go down.
Now, if I couple this sentence with this table from the ecb.int website:

Snap1.jpg

If I put the two things together, then my trade can only be good, because the interest rates cannot go any lower, so they can only rise. And then the Bund value will go down, won't it?

Let's put the two things next to one another and see what happened with changes in the interest rates, and we'll know the answer.

[...]

It sucks. I looked hard, but here at work I could not find the data and on top of it, I have excel 2007, which is a crappy version of excel and I can't figure out how to customize the chart, as necessary. I will attach the file, and finish the work at home (memo to self: i used the price of the last day of the month):
View attachment ecb_rates_and_bund.xls

However, in the meanwhile, the Bund has started falling, finally.

[...]

Yeah, definitely there's a big correlation, as they say: high rate, low bund, and viceversa.

we.jpg

Here's the updated file:
View attachment ecb_rates_vs_bund.xls

Too bad I'm about to retire completely as a discretionary trader, and so I won't be able to take advantage of this "fundamental" insights.
 
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starting to read Michael J. Mauboussin's essay

Maybe this is the easiest essay on money management I got my hands on. The best thing for me to read right now:
Size Matters - The Kelly Criterion and the Importance of Money Management by Michael J. Mauboussin.
As an investor, maximizing wealth over time requires you to do two things: find situations where you have an analytical edge; and allocate the appropriate amount of capital when you do have an edge. While Wall Street dedicates a substantial percentage of time and effort trying to gain an edge, very few portfolio managers
understand how to size their positions to maximize long-term wealth.

A simple example illustrates the point. Assume you can participate in a coin toss game where heads pays $2 and tails costs $1. You start with a $100 bankroll and can play for 40 rounds. What betting strategy will allow you to achieve the greatest probability of the most money at the end of the fortieth round?

We’ll get to the answer in a moment, but let’s consider the obvious extremes: if you bet too little, you won’t take advantage of a clearly positive expected-value opportunity. On the other hand, if you bet everything, you risk losing all of your money. Money management is all about determining the right amount of capital to allocate to an investment opportunity, given the edge and the frequency of such opportunities.
Related to this post I wrote a few days ago:
http://www.trade2win.com/boards/trading-journals/140032-my-journal-3-a-61.html#post1797886

After starting Bernoulli's paper (a mess, unclear, but I'll still read it), and following Shiller's lessons (cfr. previous posts), I feel I can add just one more simultaneous task, before it becomes counter-productive.

Besides, today I am at work but I am sick and I already told my boss that tomorrow (Friday) I won't come, so I took advantage of the printer and printed Mauboussin's paper, to be read in the bath tub in the next few days.

Once I'll get home, I'll also have to finish that work on GBL (cfr. previous post).
 
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umpteenth try

Ok, damn.

This week, too, I ended up losing about 1000 from tampering and so now we're pretty much even. Almost all of the money that I made by tampering in the first two weeks, I have now lost by tampering.

The only good thing is that I made some extra money at the start, when the systems needed it the most.

Now I am at 8k, still 100% of what I started with.

I am going to try for the umpteenth time to relax, watch tv, and not touch this mother ****ing machine that I built.
 
Going to bed. I am pretty frustrated. My small capital feels so precious that I won't let the systems trade, and yet that's the only way to make more money. Instead, I try with extreme care, to place some trades of mine, and yet those are precisely the ones that lose money. Totally pissed off and worn out.

Damn me for ever placing that QG trade from which began my heavy duty tampering with the systems. Damn me. Now I've gotta try to forget about the systems. And only check them twice a day.
 
I got to this lecture and it turned out to be dead on target:

4. Portfolio Diversification and Supporting Financial Institutions (CAPM Model) - YouTube

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Capital_asset_pricing_model

As he says here (from the transcript, minute 10 on the video):
http://oyc.yale.edu/transcript/971/econ-252-08
Now, I want to talk about forming a portfolio where the assets are not independent of each other, but are correlated with each other. What I'm going to do now — let's start out with the case where — now it's going to get a little bit more complicated if we drop the independence assumption. I'm going to drop more than the independence assumption, I'm going to assume that the assets don't have the same expected return and they don't have the same expected variance.
This is the whole problem I've been having. That's why I took up math again, and got myself into this mess. To solve the problem he starts addressing at minute 10.

Up to here, I've built my portfolio through empirical methods (whether alone, or with the investors, who got me started reasoning on it), but now I want to know the math and the principles behind it, so I can do it faster and more efficiently.

The ingredients seem to be these three:
1) how correlated your systems are
2) how much they make
3) how much variability they have

I still ignore the recipe on how to mix them together to come up with the optimal portfolio.
 
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sharpe ratio and CAPM

I have noticed that as I keep listening to shiller's lecture on portfolio theory, I keep on being reminded that the capital asset pricing model (CAPM) is very related to the sharpe ratio (same theorists), which I already use. Although the sharpe ratio alone might not be enough to build my portfolio.

Furthermore, I went and picked it up and it turned out everyone has his own view on how you calculate it. And right now I still cannot figure out what sharpe himself says about it:
The Sharpe Ratio

The best thing I could find on it is the following post, which confirms that this formula I've been using is correct:
=(SQRT(traded days in a year)*AVERAGE(trades))/STDEV(trades)

https://www.quantnet.com/forum/threads/sharpe-ratio-question.3217/#post-28655
He's right - without the risk free rate, it's not really a Sharpe ratio. It's more like a coefficient of variation.
The Sharpe Ratio
Also, how you annualize depends on how you are bearing risk - if you are holding a position even on the days you don't trade, you have exposure and you should count those days, because the market could move, which obviously would affect your mean and st dev. If you have a position every day, you annualize the daily mean (log returns, now) by multiplying by 252, the number of trading days in a year, not 365, because the market isn't open and doesn't move every day. The st dev is multiplied by the square root of 252. If you are out of the market and have no position most of the time, then you annualize by multiplying by a lower day count.
Also, most people use STDEV, not STDEVP. It's always a sample, not a population - you didn't count every trade, change in the bid - ask, etc.
If you multiply the numerator by 252 and the denominator by the square root of it, then obviously all you need to do is multiply the numerator by the square root of 252, which is what I've been doing.

Now I know what work on, I understand in which direction I have to go (much in the same direction as I've been going, thanks to the investors, who got me going with the sharpe ratio and similar reasoning). However, it is going to take a while before I can cover the material I need to cover, do the reasoning I need to do, but I now finally have a pretty complete idea of what I need.

The amount of math exercises I did, and especially the previous work I did for the investors (a lot of excel work, a lot of stats and a lot of exhausting double-checking), have really worn out me and my eyes, and I might, I should, take it easy for a few weeks starting now. Watch tv and similar. My brain is not capable of processing so much information at once and I can't go from elementary school math to graduate school math within 5 months, without burning myself out. I will take it easy as much as I can. Obviously I am not lazy - I work too much - so taking it easy can only be good for me.
 
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weekly update

Update coming up in about an hour.

Warren G - Regulate ft. Nate Dogg - YouTube
[G:]
It was a clear black night, a clear white moon
Warren G was on the streets, trying to consume
some skirts for the eve, so I can get some funk
just rollin in my ride, chillin all alone

[Nate:]
Just hit the Eastside of the LBC
on a mission trying to find Mr. Warren G.
Seen a car full of girls ain't no need to tweak
all you skirts know what's up with 213

This week went ok for me, but much better for my systems. Unfortunately I tampered, so I didn't take full advantage of them. Well, so be it. Let's just be happy to have found out that they work.

TOTO - "Hold the Line" - YouTube

It's not in the way that you hold me
It's not in the way you say you care
It's not in the way you've been treating my friends
It's not in the way that you stayed till the end
It's not in the way you look or the things that you say that you'll do

Hold the line, love isn't always on time, oh oh oh
Hold the line, love isn't always on time, oh oh oh

Gotta preserve my eyes so I'll keep it short.

Chart with the arrow on where I started trading the systems (with tampering):

Snap2.jpg


Table with weekly profit since I started trading the systems 7 weeks ago (with tampering, so usually I made less and lost less):

Snap1.jpg


With tampering I took my account from 4000 to 9500. Without tampering I would have... 10,000. Damn!

This song is dedicated to my systems, whom I still haven't learned to trust, after all these years of good performance (the faulty money management is not their fault).

Tracy Chapman - Baby Can I Hold You - YouTube

Sorry
Is all that you cant say
Years gone by and still
Words dont come easily
Like sorry like sorry

Forgive me
Is all that you cant say
Years gone by and still
Words dont come easily
Like forgive me forgive me

But you can say baby
Baby can I hold you tonight
Maybe if I told you the right words
At the right time youd be mine

I love you
Is all that you cant say
Years gone by and still
Words dont come easily
Like I love you I love you
 
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more on euro-bund future

Continuing from here:
http://www.trade2win.com/boards/trading-journals/140032-my-journal-3-a-65.html#post1800706

I found two interesting university papers and two other good links on how the bund works.

First, the two glossary links. The first is from the german wikipedia, translated by google:
Google Translate
Interesting that it says it is a fictitious federal loan:
The Euro Bund Future is a financial instrument that represents a commitment to a fictitious federal loan to buy at a certain future date (delivery) to the final agreed price (face value).

This is good, too, from trade2win itself:
Bund - Traderpedia

And here's the first of two essays (from which I quote just one of the many interesting paragraphs):
http://www.yats.com/doc/var-study-001-en.pdf
As described by Eurex, the Euro Bund Future (FGBL) is a notional long-term debt instrument issued by the German Federal Government with a term of 8.5 to 10.5 years and an interest rate of 6 percent. Contract Size is EUR 100 000. Quotation is in a percentage of the par value, carried out two decimal places. Minimum price movement (tick) is 0.01 percent, representing a value of EUR 10.

Here's the other essay, the best one, dead on target, but I don't have the time read it right now:
On implementing Euro-Bund futures pricing by Young Kim

Oh, and incidentally: the whole point of my research is that, since I am short on the Bund, I want to know how much more it can rise.
 
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Mauboussin, and my assessment of the portfolio theory work ahead

Mauboussin does a great job at summarizing the two schools and portfolio theories that I've read about so far:
http://www.capatcolumbia.com/MM LMCM reports/Size Matters.pdf

1) kelly (and thorp and others), which he calls also "maximizing the geometric mean"
2) markowitz (and samuelson and others), which he calls also "maximizing the arithmetic mean" and "mean/variance efficiency"
Based on information theory, the Kelly Criterion says an investor should choose the investment(s)
with the highest geometric mean return. This strategy is distinct from those based on
mean/variance efficiency. Importantly, however, you can calculate geometric mean using the
same arithmetic mean and variance from mean/variance models.

Furthermore, the author says that even among the CAPM theorists there's disagreement and that Markowitz himself did not disagree with the "geometric mean approach" (I don't even know what it is precisely):
There are two other problems with utility theory and investing. The first comes from the father of
mean/variance analysis, Harry Markowitz. In his famous Portfolio Selection, Markowitz advocates
the geometric mean maximization approach. In spite of arguments by Jan Mossin (one of the
founders of the capital asset pricing model) and Samuelson in the 1960s, Markowitz reconfirmed
his endorsement of the geometric mean maximization strategy in the preface to his second
edition published in 1970.
So, ok: kelly and thorp and poundstone all agree on pretty much everything, and say kelly is better than markowitz. But the academics and the CAPM disagree (more so for everyone who came after markowitz), ignore or look down on kelly supporters, and have affected the fund managers greatly and in a negative way, as Mauboussin says, but not to the extent of what Scott Vincent says (cfr. this post).

Mauboussin is both an academic and a fund manager, so he knows theory but doesn't waste time on bull****, and although he has read everything there was to read, he sums it all up, practically, for me. Still not enough for me, though. But it's best thing I read so far in terms of conciseness.

While reading Mauboussin's paper, I redefined the issues at stake as far as I'm concerned.

1) Diversification is good, but adding more systems does not necessarily produce diversification. By adding correlated systems I may actually be decreasing the diversification of my portfolio. That is why portfolio theory has become so crucial.

2) Now, just as diversification might actually not diversify but concentrate, also the study of correlation to avoid faulty diversification, might not be enough and be misleading, because past correlation (unless we're talking about YM - ES - NQ, and ZN - GBL, and currencies, and similar other correlated futures) does not imply future correlation, and viceversa.

3) It is better to build a portfolio through good and proven empirical/practical stastistical work (including resampling), like I've been doing so far, than using a faulty theoretical approach - which is all I could afford right now if I went the other way. On the other hand, a theoretical understanding of the issues is my ultimate goal, because it will allow a faster and more coherent building of my portfolio - but, as i said, I can't do it yet. Until then, I'll be sticking to my present empirical approach. Until then, I'll keep on studying the ingredients of portfolio theory. Until then, however, I'll keep on using portfolio practice.

...

Speaking of learning the ingredients, this is the kitchen I need to hang around:
4. Portfolio Diversification and Supporting Financial Institutions (CAPM Model) - YouTube
I am still stuck with the summation notation. It has the power of driving me crazy and making simple things appear complex to me. I'll only be able to digest 10 seconds of this class per day. But there's no way around it: all the portfolio theory books are full of such formulas.

[...]

Trying to find out if the sharpe ratio is enough to do the efficient frontier calculations, in that they both use profit over variability, and since I'm already acquainted with the sharpe ratio, it would save me a lot of work.

For a few minutes I was looking for "efficient frontier" calculators and excel sheets, but they're all pretty crappy and poorly made, and even the best one is crappy, the one in Solver:
Example: Portfolio Optimization - Efficient Frontier Markowitz Method - Frontline Systems

Besides, I'd much rather understand things and then implement them on my own, so I moved on to another search:
sharpe ratio vs efficient frontier
If these two are the same thing, then I can handle the sharpe ratio. Been doing it for a year, with the investors.

I need to squeeze my last few resources left, and I can't afford to waste time doing unnecessary work.

[...]

Good link with an efficient frontier calculator, but nothing for futures:
Efficient Frontier
Still, an awesome job they did.

Inno dei Sommergibili - Italian Submarines in WWII -Tribute- - YouTube

[...]

Ultimately the concepts I have to focus on are those expressed by these three people:
1) markowitz
2) kelly
3) sharpe

If I can find a way to fit together their three slightly different recipes, or to create a recipe of my own that uses their main ideas, then I am set. The problem to tackle gets clearer and clearer...

I just wish there were an intermediate step for me, something like "portfolio theory for dummies". But there isn't. I feel like a child who tries to climb a set of stairs with high steps. I get tired. And I feel like quitting. It's like learning a foreign language: you can't learn Arabic overnight. It doesn't matter if you immerse yourself in their culture. This is not as hard as learning Arabic for me, but it renders the idea.

What would be ideal is if I could find another 20 papers like the one Mauboussin wrote.
 
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Aaron Brown: When Harry met John

From:
https://www.quantnet.com/risk-versus-portfolio-management/
When Harry met John

Markowitz taught us how to think about relative allocations among simultaneous dependent bets in order to maximize a utility function. Kelly taught us how to think about absolute risk amounts over sequential independent bets, without reference to utility. Together these define unique investment amounts for each asset. Markowitz’s key ratio is excess return divided by standard deviation (Sharpe ratio), Kelly’s is excess return divided by variance. Note that these have different dimensionality. Sharpe ratio depends on time horizon, but not on bet size; Kelly ratio depends on bet size, but not on time horizon.

In practice, investment decisions do not fall neatly into Markowitz or Kelly idealizations. We live in a finite period world, not one period nor infinite periods. Everything depends on both size and time horizon. So portfolio managers and risk managers cannot inhabit separate silos, they must often confer to make good joint decisions. But there are reasons to separate the decisions as well. Portfolio management is highly multidimensional and data-dependent, it is forced to be at least partly parametric. Risk management is low-dimensional and uses much less data, it relies on non-parametric methods. The most important question for a portfolio manager is expected return, the most important question for a risk manager is worst-case return. While it’s possible for one person to do both, the fields are so different that it usually makes sense to separate the jobs.

This is the vision of risk management that was hashed out from 1987 to 1993, along with specific mathematical tools for implementation. The initial problem was how to set the optimal position risk for a trading desk. There were three major starting points. I was in the “value” camp which held the key measure was daily P&L, ignoring trades done during the day, in normal markets. The “capital” camp focused on the economic resources necessary to support a level of risk-taking, and the “earnings” camp modeled the effect on earnings. This was a bottom-up movement of traders and other financial risk-takers trying to run their own businesses better.

Around 1990, some large financial institutions got concerned about several different businesses unknowingly making the same bet. The top executives wanted reports to aggregate risk throughout the institution. “Value” was the only candidate for a measure, because P&L was the only thing that was defined consistently and controlled in all businesses, and it was the only one available daily. However, we value people tended to use complex metrics that could not be easily aggregated. The only simple metric was the one capital people used. They worried about how much capital was “at risk,” in the sense of how much you could lose at a level of probability equal to the default probability of bonds of a certain credit rating (knowing that allowed you to compute the market cost of your capital). Thus Value-at-Risk (VaR) was born, a name that makes no sense except historically.

Someday, this will all be in a textbook: how the modern field of financial risk management developed, what practicing financial risk managers actually do, and what knowledge and skills you need to help in the professional effort and advance the state of the art. Someday, students will be taught that risk “management” does not mean “constrained minimization of” risk, and that “risks” are distinct from “dangers” and “opportunities.” Someday, John Kelly (and Ed Thorp who developed Kelly’s ideas for risk management) will have more space in risk management textbooks than Harry Markowitz or William Sharpe. Until then, you’ll have to rely on your quantitative skills to figure it out for yourself.
This is awesome. He just confirmed to me that I am totally on track and that, as I thought, the fab four are markowitz-sharpe and kelly-thorp. Now all that I am really lacking is the math skills to keep going, but those can be developed, little by little. I am already caught up with high school math.

This article came out of a google search for hits that had all these three names: markowitz, kelly, sharpe:
https://www.google.com/search?as_q=...=any&safe=images&tbs=&as_filetype=&as_rights=

I might add "thorp" and keep browsing through the hits. I am really getting things done. Wonderful.

What Aaron Brown also seems to say in his article is that kelly-thorp are in the field of risk management, and markowitz-sharpe are in the field of portfolio/money management. I don't know enough about this subject to really understand this concept and most of this article. But what matters is that I am improving.

Another thing I got from Mauboussin (cfr.previous post) is that markowitz-sharpe are about maximizing the arithmetic mean, and kelly is about maximizing the geometric mean, which is also said here about bernoulli:
Kelly criterion - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

I still don't understand much of this, but I've got some names, and in light of my recent readings, the authors to study are now five, in chronological order: Bernoulli (1738), Markowitz (1952), Kelly (1956), Thorp (1962), Sharpe (1966).

If he only wrote in English, instead of Latin (the translation is not clear), Bernoulli would be within my reach, because of course back then they knew a lot less. But written the way it is written, it's just as hard as the others. Kelly's paper, Markowitz's, they're both incomprehensible to me right now. I am not even going to try viewing Sharpe's. All I can do right now is listen to videos about these 5 authors, in particular the lectures by Shiller and Geanakoplos, but even those are anything but easy, considering that the aveage Yale student is a Valedictorian in high school, and I used to skip classes instead.

I'm gonna keep going for a while, in this same post and quote other interesting links I get from that google search (cfr.above link):
Portfolio Theory
Prior to Markowitz's work, investors focused on assessing the risks and rewards of individual securities in constructing their portfolios. Standard investment advice was to identify those securities that offered the best opportunities for gain with the least risk and then construct a portfolio from these. Following this advice, an investor might conclude that railroad stocks all offered good risk-reward characteristics and compile a portfolio entirely from these. Intuitively, this would be foolish. Markowitz formalized this intuition. Detailing a mathematics of diversification, he proposed that investors focus on selecting portfolios based on their overall risk-reward characteristics instead of merely compiling portfolios from securities that each individually have attractive risk-reward characteristics. In a nutshell, inventors should select portfolios not individual securities.
Very good summary.

Bingo!
http://web.iese.edu/jestrada/PDF/Research/Refereed/GMM-Extended.pdf
Abstract
Academics and practitioners usually optimize portfolios on the basis of mean and variance. They set the goal
of maximizing risk-adjusted returns measured by the Sharpe ratio and thus determine their optimal exposures to
the assets considered. However, there is an alternative criterion that has an equally plausible underlying idea;
geometric mean maximization aims to maximize the growth of the capital invested, thus seeking to maximize
terminal wealth. This criterion has several attractive properties and is easy to implement, and yet it seems to have
taken a back seat to the maximization of risk-adjusted returns. The ultimate goal of this article is to compare
both criteria from an empirical perspective. The results reported and discussed leave the question posed in the title
largely intact: Are academics and practitioners overlooking a useful portfolio approach?
Sounds good. Dead on target. Who's this guy?
Javier Estrada - IESE Business School
http://web.iese.edu/jestrada/PDF/Stuff/Estrada-CV.pdf
So far, after reading one page, he has a gift for clarity. And for synthesis:
Markowitz (1952, 1959) was the first to advocate the focus on mean and variance and the selection of portfolios with the lowest risk (volatility) for a target level of return, or the highest return for a target level of risk. Sharpe (1964), Lintner (1965), and Mossin (1966) complemented this insight by arguing that, given a risk-free rate, the optimal combination of risky assets is given by the market (or tangency) portfolio, which is the one that maximizes returns in excess of the
risk-free rate per unit of volatility risk.1 Selecting the portfolio of risky assets that maximizes the Sharpe ratio has been the standard criterion for academics and practitioners ever since.
He deserves a post to himself, with a big title and his name. This is too good to be placed on the bottom of a post titled with someone else's name (Aaron Brown's).

Frank Sinatra - More (Theme from Mondo Cane) - YouTube
 
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Javier Estrada - Geometric Mean Maximization: An Overlooked Portfolio Approach?

Continuing from the previous post, reading and commenting on this paper:
http://web.iese.edu/jestrada/PDF/Research/Refereed/GMM-Extended.pdf

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xAh6fk0KD1c
Investors, however, find risk-adjusted returns more difficult to digest. Few (if any) of
them, upon receiving their periodic financial statements, hasten to look at the Sharpe ratio of
their investments; rather, they tend to focus on whether or not their invested capital grows and
the rate at which it does. Furthermore, fund management companies tend to summarize
performance with the mean compound return of their funds. For both reasons, then, a potential
plausible goal for portfolio managers to adopt would be to grow the capital entrusted to them at
the fastest possible rate; that is, to maximize the geometric mean return of their portfolios.
Red Hot Chili Peppers - Can´t Stop (Music Video) w/ lyrics in description - YouTube
At least two questions arise naturally from this discussion. First, is the portfolio that
grows at the fastest rate the one that yields the highest risk-adjusted returns? As discussed in
more detail below, in general, that is not the case. Second, given that the portfolio that
maximizes the geometric mean return and the one that maximizes the Sharpe ratio are in general
different, which one of the two is more attractive? Providing an empirical perspective on this
question is one of the main goals of this article.
Awesome, awesome, awesome.

THE SWINGLE SINGERS - Libertango - YouTube
The criterion at the heart of this article has been variously referred to in the literature as
the Kelly criterion, the growth optimal portfolio, the capital growth theory of investment, the
geometric mean strategy, investment for the long run, maximum expected log, and here as
geometric mean maximization (GMM).

Importantly, note that the SRM criterion, based on the static model of Markowitz (1952,
1959), Sharpe (1964), Lintner (1965), and Mossin (1966), is a one-period framework. In contrast,
the GMM criterion introduced by Kelly (1956) and Latane (1959) is a multiperiod framework with
cumulative results, which is consistent with the way most investors think about their portfolios.
Interesting, because Mauboussin said the opposite:
Investors checking their portfolios frequently, especially volatile portfolios, are likely to suffer from
myopic loss aversion. The key point is that a Kelly system, which requires a long-term
perspective to be effective, is inherently very difficult for investors to deal with psychologically.
One says investors want kelly, and the other says investors want markowitz - yet they both agree that kelly is overlooked in the financial community and both agree that it should be valued much more.
This distinction is critical because optimal decisions for a single period may be suboptimal in a
multiperiod framework.8 Similarly, the relevant variables in a cumulative framework are different
from those relevant when gains and losses are not reinvested; the geometric mean is relevant in
the first case, and the arithmetic mean in the second.
Although GMM was proposed as an alternative to mean-variance optimization,
curiously, one of the strongest early supporters of this alternative criterion was Harry Markowitz.
In fact, not only did he allocate the entire chapter VI of his pioneering book (Markowitz, 1959)
to ‘Return in the Long Run’ but he also added a ‘Note on Chapter VI’ on a later edition. (More
on it below.) Markowitz (1976) subsequently reaffirmed his support for the GMM criterion.
Wow, Estrada has realy proven to have read everything, and to be interested in all these things. Everything he says agrees with the previous papers I read by Mauboussin and Vincent. I'm gonna have to add his paper on my signature. But there's no more room, so I'll have to remove one of thorp's papers. I'll remove the one I've read, the 2007 one.

In ‘Note on Chapter VI,’ on a later edition of his 1959 pioneering book, Markowitz tried
to reconcile the arguments of Kelly (1956), Latane (1959), Breiman (1961), and his own with
those of Samuelson (1971). He concluded that these two seemingly opposing positions can be
true at the same time: Samuelson is correct in pointing out that maximizing the geometric mean
return is not necessarily consistent with maximizing expected utility; and Kelly-Latane-Breiman-
Markowitz are correct in pointing out that, despite Samuelson’s irrefutable argument, GMM may
still be a plausible and useful criterion.
Richard Galliano playing Libertango (Piazzolla Forever) NEW VIDEO !!! - YouTube

I'm gonna take a break and finish my khan academy review exercises. I'll have to resume from page 8.

This one is my 310th exercise and last exercise (will be when I'll finish it):
Graphing parabolas 2 | Khan Academy
and it's driving me crazy, because, once every 5 problems I solve, I get some detail wrong and come up with the wrong final answer, and then it sets my progress back and I have to another whole set of 10 straight problems right before it counts it as "completed". But the reason I get it wrong is probably because of my declining eyesight. I am going to have to get some eyeglasses because... after this portfolio feat, I'll need some glasses. It sucks. In fact I used to have glasses, but I stopped using them. Then... I think my mom, that stupid retarded bitch has messed in my room, in another city, not here in rome... in another city, where my other home is, and she lost my glasses, after losing my yearbook a few years ago. Stupid, retarded, bitch. I can't tolerate stupid disorderly people who cause me damage.

Anyway, khan academy is exhausting and it's burning me out. I finished everything months ago. They keep on adding new exercises, and every day i get on average 10 review exercises. I feel like quitting, but I don't want to be accused of laziness, by my own self, so I'm still doing them. I have a complex of being lazy, and being told that I avoid hard work, so as a... yeah, cause my father has told me so all my life, so as a consequence I tend to embark on all the heavy work, even at the office. If there's something others avoid because it's heavy, then I end up doing it. But no one rewards me for this. Anyway. Let's finish this damn exercise and keep reading that interesting paper i was reading. But I do need khan because overall he is the one who gave me my math confidence back (after losing it in high school).

[...]

Ok, still not done with math, but I read a little more, up to the middle of page 9. Basically i can say for sure that there is no agreement whatsoever between academics on how a portfolio should be built (even for a specific client). This is a pain in the ass, and at the same time reassuring, because it means that I'm not that stupid for considering this field complex. I think I'm gonna figure it out, if i live long enough.

Ok, on page 9 he starts talking about "Methodology" and he starts with all the summation notation. Damn, I have to go over the damnation summation notation again (course which I covered completely just 3 months ago):
http://www.statpower.net/Content/310/Summation Algebra.pdf

It's amazing how I already forgot almost all of it, and can't even understand what this means:

Snap1.jpg

I guess this is because khan didn't devise any exercises on summation notation, and I can't learn things from manuals. I need exercises to learn things.

So I guess I am kind of stuck with everything I was doing: on both Estrada's paper and Shiller's class, I am stuck because of my lack of literacy in summation notation. On Khan's review exercises, I am stuck because he just shoves them down my throat at an unacceptable rate.

But guess what: if I live, I'll keep coming back at these problems, because we are the champions, my friend, and we'll keep on fighting till the end.

[...]

god!

DONE!!! (for today)

2.jpg

1.jpg

They're really wearing me out! This thing never ends...

My eyes are killing me...
 
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that's it, I've done it

My life has taken another turn again, as travis bickle would say...
My life has taken another turn again. The days can go on with regularity over and over, one day indistinguishable from the next. A long continuous chain. Then suddenly, there is a change.
I was in the bath tub and I came up with this great idea, as I often do when I am in the bath tub. Since I want to work but at the same time stay away from the computer, why don't I take private lessons of math? They only cost 15 to 30 euros per hour, and it'd keep me from compulsive gambling, from losing my eye-sight... just perfect.

So I got in touch with two people already (one is a friend, math professor, and another one I found on the web), and asked them if they'd take me as a student. In particular, summation notation and financial math in general, which for some reason in English is called "mathematical finance", which doesn't make any sense, because in every other language it's "financial math", including German.

I could make a complete transition, profit allowing, from doing things on the internet to doing them in real life. The movies not on the web, streaming, but in a movie theater, and that's organized already. The math lessons not on the web but with a real teacher in front of me. And the psychoanalytic sessions not on this journal but with a real psychiatrist - but that's a long shot, because that's way too expensive for me - not profitable enough yet. If anything, I should invest and get a gang started, start an extortion racket that threatens psychiatrists.

Then sooner or later I'll also invest in a pair of glasses, provided my mom doesn't find those I had, which she said she lost. All she had to do was leave my dresser alone and leave my room as she found it. Stupid retarded bitch. I have no respect for idiots. She purposely goes to my room to lose my stuff. Stuff that I have placed in my drawers. Man, how much more retarded can my mom get? How retarded do you have to be to lose other people's stuff from their own rooms? She probably hosted someone in my room, removed my stuff temporarily, and then misplaced it. I can't believe I am so intelligent with such a stupid mom. The way it went is that she was beautiful and my dad was ugly but intelligent, so he married her. You know, it sucks that beautiful women are encouraged to be stupid, or maybe it's some other reason that my mom is stupid. Probably her father who didn't value her reasoning and treated her as stupid, and so she became chronically insecure, and stupid as a consequence. That's something else I cannot stand: parents who destroy their children emotionally by despising them and never appreciating anything they do. My dad is that way, too. ****ing asshole. Anyway, from now on, I will probably post a little less, because of wanting to save my eyesight and because I'll go to the movies, and take math lessons.

8. Libertango / New York Tango -- Piazzolla / Galliano - YouTube
 
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Negative balance on both my QG and GBL trades. I didn't have the capital nor the patience to embark on those two trades. But I keep forgetting these things. That's why automated trading is so good. Because once you set a rule, that is the rule, and it is always remembered. Let alone that it also learns from experiences it didn't have to live (from back-testing). Automated trading is more patient, balanced and knowledgeable than I'll ever be.
 
Still one hour to go here at the office, and a reasonable amount of work, that I can easily do in just 40 minutes.

The boss is not here today: he's got a fever. Maybe I am the one who gave him the fever - I had it on Thursday, when I still came, because the medical paperwork makes it easier to come when you're sick (if you're missing for just one day, as I did on Friday, you can say "sick" but do not need any paperwork).

The GBL trade is now at breakeven, and the QG trade is down about 1000 dollars. I just can't believe natural gas could fall any lower, and instead it's falling. At least the GBL so far didn't let me down. But the thing is that I am so impatient, that I tend to close the dangerous top/bottom picking trades as soon as they break even. So all this huge risk I take is for no gain, practically. Or little gain.

Oh, damn, now the beasts in the room next to mine are whistling some tune, and snapping their fingers... what a bunch of animals I have to work with. They're not here to work, they're just here to get paid. No wonder I always keep my door shut.

Anyway, these QG and GBL are my last two trades as a discretionary trader and then I'll retire. I just cannot absolutely close them now that they seem so advantageous. When I am losing money and have been losing money on a top/bottom picking trade for a few days, and have been monitoring that market for a few days (for natural gas it's been weeks), that's when you know that market is about to bounce. Yeah, because I never go in late, but I don't go in too early either.

The best thing would be to follow me after a few days, and after you read that I am losing money. Which is exactly now.

I mean, actually for the GBL it might even be too late because it has already started falling and this time it's not looking back.

But for NG the timing seems right:

cbotcis.png

I mean, natural gas cannot go to zero, and if you buy a QG you would still lose less than 6000.

I cannot do the same reasoning for GBL because I do not know how it works. I don't know if in theory it could go higher than 140 or even 150. It's all explained here, but I don't understand jack ****:

Eurex - Deliverable Bonds and Conversion Factors

conv_factor_btp_1_en.gif

This tells me once again that I should get going with those math private lessons.
 
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More on Javier Estrada

Continuing from here:
http://www.trade2win.com/boards/trading-journals/140032-my-journal-3-a-67.html#post1802454

Reviewing this book:
http://web.iese.edu/jestrada/PDF/Research/Refereed/GMM-Extended.pdf

Despite the summation notation keeping me from understanding everything, I kept reading and it finally became clear, at least according to Javier Estrada, and he knows a lot, that maximizing the Sharpe Ratio also means applying markowitz's MPT principles (quote is from page 9):
Maximizing risk-adjusted returns when risk is measured by volatility amounts to maximizing a portfolio’s Sharpe ratio
Now... actually I don't really understand how sharpe ratio alone can be enough, because the efficient frontier only means you're have the lowest variability for a given level of return, and the highest return for a given level of variability. And therefore you can't just say "this is the optimal portfolio". Right? You could say "this is the optimal portfolio for an expected return of x" or "this is the optimal portfolio for an expected variability of y", but you can't just say "this is the best portfolio" period. And yet, since the sharpe ratio (of the portfolio) goes higher and higher, it is indeed stating that a given portfolio is better than another, and so this seems contradictory, and makes me wonder how the sharpe ratio could ever compare effectively two portfolios that have two different variabilities or two different returns. But even this doubt doesn't concern me right now.

It doesn't matter. It probably arises from my math gaps, and if I make money, I can buy all the math private lessons in the world and figure out much more, also getting the private professors themselves into this intricate mess.

All I needed to get from this quote and this page of Estrada is that markowitz's MPT is summed up by Sharpe Ratio, which I have pretty much digested and have been using for over a year now (this time thanks to the investors, who got me started on it).

So, if markowitz is taken care of by the sharpe ratio, and, having divided all portfolio theory I'll ever need into 1) markowitz & sharpe and 2) kelly & thorp, now all I have left is to address the other couple of theorists.

Well, it turns out that theory does not regard me right now. Kelly is not an issue right now, because there's no way I could divide my bet size into anything smaller than one contract, which is what I can barely afford right now. So for now and for the next few months, kelly is absolutely not my concern.


Choosing my next practical step

So my next step, on top of doing all the math exercises in the world, will be to address this question: how do I maximize the portfolio's sharpe ratio?

I'm going to need a lot of studying to do this, but I can do it thoroughly, and without the need for any more math (I'll still study math, just in case I'll need more portfolio theory, which definitely requires math).

Not that I haven't ever exercised in optimizing the portfolio's sharpe ratio, but there's a risk of over-optimization, as happened this last summer. So I am going to start a whole new post (and series of posts) to address this problem. This is worth doing in depth, as it is going to be the only practical practical problem I'll have for the rest of this year.
 
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experimenting with portfolio sharpe ratio: #1

I am only using two hypothetical systems and seeing how changes in the trades affect the overall sharpe ratio. The objective now is not to find my best systems or optimal portfolio, but to understand the nature of the sharpe ratio and how several systems affect the collective sharpe ratio.

For example, what happens if you add together two systems with a sharpe ratio of 1? Does the collective sharpe ratio increase or stay the same?

And many similar questions.

Of course in these experiments I'll do everything on excel, and I'll attach the files in the post.

Changing my signature again: with ranking according to relevance
I am going to modify my signature again, and add a number to the names of my signature "Anderson-Faff, Bernoulli, Chan, Cover, Estrada, Geanakoplos, Grinold-Kahn, Mauboussin, Sewell, Shiller, Thorp, Vince, Wilmott" (each name is linked to an online book/paper in .pdf format). Each name will now have an attached number that will indicate how relevant I consider the book/paper for my portfolio theory needs.

[...]

I have done some work, on the limits of the sharpe ratio:
View attachment limits_of_sharpe_ratio.xls
(just modified it again, and now again, and now again)

Ok, I am done for today. With all these limits in mind, I'll still use the sharpe ratio and... until I'll know it like the back of my hand.

Then I'll optimize the portfolio's sharpe ratio.

The next file should be titled "pros of sharpe ratio".

Ok, enough for today.

Let me just recap what i've noticed:
1) sharpe ratio cares about the ratio of wins to variability
2) it doesn't give a **** about the money made, so if a system makes a great Return on Investment, sharpe ratio won't notice it (that's one of the things markowitz fans might have brought up in one of their papers)
3) it doesn't see drawdown, because the order of the trades doesn't matter to it. So once again, if you measure your profit based on how much you could lose vs how much you make on average, then sharpe ratio won't tell you.

So, recapitulating the last two, sharpe ratio doesn't care how much margin a system uses, and doesn't care how much drawdown it has. Pretty bad at measuring the best way to use your capital.

4) minor detail: SR is measured with STDEV on excel, and if the trades increase (with the edge constant), that value tends to increase because of the N-1 bull**** used by the STDEV function. The same doesn't happen if you use STDEVP, but they all say to use STDEV, so up to you. But the difference is very small with large number of trades.

5) This is not a limit, but a characteristic. Due to the sharpe ratio using the standard deviation and to the latter's behaviour, adding up systems with wins/losses of distant value may cause the portfolio sharpe ratio to be lower than the average of the systems: you add diversification, but you get a lower sharpe ratio. Yeah. Believe it or not. You could add 2 systems with a sharpe ratio of 5 and get a combined sharpe ratio of 4. Pretty crazy.

In the next few weeks, I'm gonna keep on experimenting with the portfolio sharpe ratio and studying how it's affected by various hypothetical systems. This is a great activity in that it's both very simple and effective. I like everything that is concise. I like synthesis.
 
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Ole Peters: OPTIMAL LEVERAGE FROM NON-ERGODICITY

Back at the office. I found this Ole Peters' essay (through my usual markowitz-sharpe-kelly google search):
http://santafe.edu/media/workingpapers/09-02-004.pdf

It seems pretty relevant:
In modern portfolio theory, the balancing of expected returns on investments against uncertainties in those returns is aided by the use of utility functions. The Kelly criterion offers another approach, rooted in information theory, that always implies logarithmic utility. The two approaches seem incompatible, too loosely or too tightly constraining investors’ risk preferences, from their respective perspectives.
This incompatibility goes away by noticing that the model used in both approaches, geometric Brownian motion, is a non-ergodic process, in the sense that ensemble-average returns differ from time-average returns in a single realization
. The classic papers on portfolio theory use ensemble-average returns. The Kelly-result is obtained by considering time-average returns. The averages differ by a logarithm. In portfolio theory this logarithm can be implemented as a logarithmic utility function. It is important to distinguish between effects of non-ergodicity and genuine utility constraints. For instance, ensemble-average returns depend linearly on leverage. This measure can thus incentivize investors to maximize leverage, which is detrimental to time-average returns and overall market stability. A better understanding of the significance of time-irreversibility and non-ergodicity and the resulting bounds on leverage may help policy makers in reshaping financial risk controls.
Keywords: Portfolio selection, efficient frontier, leverage, log-optimality, Kelly criterion.

Why do all these ****ers have to write in such a complicated language. This seems to be dead on target but I understand very little of it. And yet it's totally relevant to my subject.

What I liked the most of the abstract is this:
"This incompatibility goes away by noticing that the model used in both approaches, geometric Brownian motion, is a non-ergodic process, in the sense that ensemble-average returns differ from time-average returns in a single realization".

If the incompatibility goes away then it means I can find a method to put the two together, but then of course I get lost, due to ignorance, when he refers to "geometric Brownian motion".

I'm gonna do some more testing on the sharpe ratio, since I can't get anything out of this paper for now.

In the meanwhile the torture of my two unprofitable QG and GBL discretionary trades continues: losing 1000 on QG and 300 on GBL.
 
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