Social Proofs

Most losers will convince themselves that nobody else is making money...therefore its ok and understandable why they themselves are not making money.They doubt and attack those that do make money

Most losers will blame their failures on software, chat room, the market, market makers, specialists, institutions, federal reserve, government, loved ones and so on.

Most losers do not have enough trading capitol to survive serious drawdown periods (losing streak) if trading via trial-n-error.

They ignore the fastest road to profits...learning from someone that's a winner.And I thank the trader on these threads who don't post a lot but is a professional trader. who have traded money for others in the USA he has taken me under his wing so to speak and put be on the correct path. I wont give away his secrets but they are all simple which a lot of traders over look.

Sun
 
DaveJB said:
My ONLY worry about private threads is that some 'trading course salesman' could sucker people in via one, whilst squelching those who screamed a warning. I don't give a purple **** if somebody disagrees with me, I'm wrong occasionally, (obviously not very often).

I suspect that a salesman would want the widest audience possible. Even so, Sharky knows what's going on. And even if he misses something, there should be no difficulty in requiring that any moderator be allowed to join if his sole reason for doing so is to observe (if he's interested in the subject matter, of course, then there's no reason for him not to participate as long as he abides by the guidelines, and I can't imagine why he wouldn't).

In my case, since only a few people have a genuine interest in the subject, there should be no problem. But there are always a few people who don't like being asked to curb their dog. :)
 
There was a study completed utilising the game show "Who wants to bea millionaire"
Now what was found was that when "ask the audience" was employed, as the audience would give their answer independantly, via an electronic button, you had individual answers tallied into a percentage.

A large proportion of the time, the higher percentage proved to be the correct answer.
Compared and contrasted to, people asked to vote on an answer in a public showing of hands.
Social pressure to conform, resulted in a very large proportion of questions being answered incorrectly.

Chart reading.......individual decision, or part of the herd response?
Fundamental analysis, .......individual, or herd?

food for thought
d998
 
sun123

They ignore the fastest road to profits...learning from someone that's a winner.And I thank the trader on these threads who don't post a lot but is a professional trader. who have traded money for others in the USA he has taken me under his wing so to speak and put be on the correct path. I wont give away his secrets but they are all simple which a lot of traders over look.

Yes, I would concur, this is the most efficient way to learn to be profitable, whatever your style of trading/investing.
Of course the primary problem is finding someone that can, and is willing to mentor you, but, (there is always a but), how as a novice can you distinguish between someone who is on the surface reasonably proficient, but has not the underlying depth of knowledge to adapt to changing market conditions.

You would therefore need someone who has been successful over many years, in all market conditions. In addition, the methodology, or methodologies would need to be teachable, and reproducible, taking into account varying degrees of apptitude from the students. Viz, logically sound principals, not based on a gut feel, or taking the pulse of the market, or a feeling based on discretionary observation.

A fairly tall order to fill. If you have discovered a such, congratulations, you have saved yourself much potential financial pain. Of course in addition you would have to filter your way through all the bogus gurus happy to teach you for $$. their road to riches. As a broad generalisation, anyone offering to teach you for a fee..........has nothing worth paying for.

cheers d998
 
The Scarcity Principal, or pseudo-Supply/Demand

This principal is based upon peoples response to assigning greater value to an item that is restricted in number, viz, collectibles, from art to baseball cards, stamps etc. This is your last chance to buy this item, as we will then be sold out, last one in inventory, etc, etc.

Within trading it has some very subtle applications, mostly in stocks, however, even in a tremendously liquid market as index futures the principal exerts a subtle influence.
The basic principal works best in stocks that appear cheap, but in reality are fully priced. The available float is huge, but demand is low. The market maker wants volume. What to do.
Raise the price, and keep it rising for mabe 3 or 4 days, so that the % rise in price shows 15%, or even slightly higher (irrespective of whether the market as a whole rises or falls). Then, on a drop in the general market, drop the price back with the market, nothing scary, but it now represents a "last chance" to participate in a stock about to move, real volume very often appears, price moves sharply higher, and all is well until......news, or reality of a big seller, or,or,or.......and the price collapses, very often with a big gap.

Volume would be the obvious indicator to filter out manipulation of this type, unfortunately, volume can also be manipulated. On the upswing, many "mechanical" systems have this type of breakout pattern as a buy, either as a pure breakout, or as a pullback/retracement, this volume is legitimate, and added to the manipulated volume, will fool many.

cheers d998
 
ducati998 said:
unfortunately, volume can also be manipulated.
While I fully understand how price is manipulated I find it difficult to come up with any process by which volume could be spoofed - reliably.

You only need buy/sell a few hundred shares at knock-down/blow-up well above/below the inside to cause a 'real' trade level to be recorded. Those who are astute and look at T&S will be clued up to the game being played and the intent. Those using purely mechanical, indicator, Pivot or Fib based approaches will base their game play on the recorded High/Low and will be appropriately suckered. But volume needs, well, VOLUME!!!

The only way I can think you'd do that is to go with real volume - achieve your aim - and then reverse with similar volume. The only trouble with that is having achieved your 'aim' (whatever it might be) you will have moved the price/action against you. Reversing with similar volume into the new market scenario you have created would involve taking some pain - if not cancelling out entirely your wins. You could well find yourself with a lot of stock and no buyers or a need to cover at high cost.

???
 
Last edited:
Tony

mmm, well you could engineer a couple of large broker to broker deals (off SETS) which have to be reported and where the volume will be included in the total volume making it look as though there has been feverish SETS activity.

good trading

jon
 
by Joel Ramin
January 13, 2000

Paul Tudor Jones II is the president and founder of Tudor Investment Corporation, and was featured in Jack D. Schwagers classic "Market Wizards". This is an edited transcript from the interview, which was held at Paul Jones's office in Greenwich, Connecticut on January 13, 2000. by Joel Ramin

Q: Can you briefly describe your background?

Paul Tudor Jones: I went to high school at Memphis University school. My father went to Virginia Law School so he steered me to the University of Virginia. I went to Virginia from 1972 to 1976, majored in economics and had a great time. I really loved UVa. I graduated and went to work for Eli Tullis who was a Virginia graduate from New Orleans. He was a cotton speculator, maybe the biggest cotton speculator, and he gave me a job on the former New York cotton exchange and I began literally two weeks after I graduated from school. That’s how I got into the futures markets.

Q: What sparked your original interest in trading?

Paul Tudor Jones: I went to New York and saw the floor of the commodities exchange and there was such an energy level there and so much excitement that I knew that was the place for me. I’ve always liked action and the exchange seemed like a perfect home for me.

Q: When did you decide you wanted to run a fund?

Paul Tudor Jones: In 1976 I started working on the floor as a clerk and then I became a broker for E.F. Hutton. In 1980 I went strictly on my own as what they called a local and did that for about two and a half years and had two and a half wonderfully

profitable years, but I really got bored. I applied to Harvard Business School, got accepted and was about to go. I literally was packed up to go and then I thought, ‘this is crazy’, because for what I’m doing here, they’re not going to teach me anything. This skill set is not something that they teach in business school. So I didn’t go, I stayed, but I was really bored because there wasn’t the personal interaction that was something that I craved and having colleagues and being in a clean atmosphere and that was when I started my fund. All through growing up I’ve been involved in team sports and fraternities and in school I was involved in a whole variety of activities all of which were team oriented and when I was on my own I was printing money every month, but I wasn’t getting the psychic satisfaction from it

Q: How would you describe your general investment philosophy?

Paul Tudor Jones: I think I am the single most conservative investor on earth in the sense that I absolutely hate losing money. My grandfather told me at a very early age that you are only worth what you can write a check for tomorrow, so the concept of having my net worth tied up in a stock a la Bill Gates, though God almighty it would be a great problem to have, it would be something that’s just anathema to me and that’s one reason that I’ve always liked the futures market so much, because you can generally get liquid and be in cash in literally the space of a few minutes. So that always appealed to me because I could always be liquid very quickly if I wanted to. I’d say that my investment philosophy is that I don’t take a lot of risk, I look for opportunities with tremendously skewed reward-risk opportunities. Don’t ever let them get into your pocket - that means there’s no reason to leverage substantially. There’s no reason to take substantial amounts of financial risk ever, because you should always be able to find something where you can skew the reward risk relationship so greatly in your favor that you can take a variety of small investments with great reward risk opportunities that should give you minimum draw down pain and maximum upside opportunities.

Q: How do you measure your performance?

Paul Tudor Jones: You’ve got to look at good traders historically. If a trader can on average annually deliver two to three times their worst draw down, then that’s a very good track record, and I’d say that that’s what I try to do. If I thought that for the funds that I managed that 10% would be the worst that I would tolerate in a given year then hopefully I’d annualize two or three times that and that’s probably what I’ve done. Maybe a little below that in the ‘90’s and a little above that in the ‘80’s.

Q: What’s your competitive advantage as a trader?

Paul Tudor Jones: The secret to being successful from a trading perspective is to have an indefatigable and an undying and unquenchable thirst for information and knowledge. Because I think there are certain situations where you can absolutely understand what motivates every buyer and seller and have a pretty good picture of what’s going to happen. And it just requires an enormous amount of grunt work and dedication to finding all possible bits of information.

You pick an instrument and there’s whole variety of benchmarks, things that you look at when trading a particular instrument whether it’s a stock or a commodity or a bond. There’s a fundamental information set that you acquire with regard to each particular asset class and then you overlay a whole host of technical indicators and that’s how you make a decision. It doesn’t make any difference whether it’s pork bellies or Yahoo. At the end of the day, it’s all the same. You need to understand what factors you need to have at your disposal to develop a core competency to make a legitimate investment decision in that particular asset class. And then at the end of the day, the most important thing is how good are you at risk control. Ninety-percent of any great trader is going to be the risk control.

Q: Can you give an example?

Paul Tudor Jones: Certainly. The one on a percentage basis that’s been the most profitable for me was the crash of 1987. There was a tremendous embedded derivatives accident waiting to happen in the crash of ‘87 because there was something in the market that time called portfolio insurance that essentially meant that when stocks started to go down it was going to create more selling because the people who had written these derivatives would be forced to sell on every down-tick. So it was a situation where you knew that if you ever got to a point where the market started to go down that the selling would actually cascade instead of dry up because of the measure of these derivative instruments that had been written. And in the crash of ‘87 you had an overvalued market and you also finally had a situation where every down-tick would create more selling and I think I understood the dynamics of that. The crash was something that was imminently forecastable to somebody that understood the measure of derivatives and how large they had grown in such a relatively short period of time and the impact that it would have on a relatively unknowing and naïve market. And the same exact thing happened in 1990 in Japan.

Q: So what is your opinion of the US equity markets now?

Paul Tudor Jones: Clearly there are parts of the US equity markets that we’ve never seen anything like it anywhere in modern times in terms of valuation. The question is what’s the trigger event that gets you to mean revert and whereas you had specific derivative inspired events in 1987, I don’t see that now. So how long can these levels of overvaluation persist? I would think rather than seeing any type of really sharp break, what you might see prospectively is something that looks a lot more like ‘68 to ‘73 did where you had big rolling corrections and rotations and a market that doesn’t really make any upside progress but with a lot of volatility that traverses big ranges.

Q: Do you have any specific catalysts that you’re looking for?

Paul Tudor Jones: I think you’re finally getting interest rates at a level where they’re extraordinarily negative for equities. You look at every bear market and they’ve always basically occurred because of an up-tick in inflation and an up-tick in interest rates. We’re definitely at a point where rates are high enough where they’re going to have a big impact on equities. When you look at the volatility we’ve had in the past month in the NASDAQ for instance, every time I’ve seen volatility like that, I don’t care what the market was, whether it was soybeans in ‘76 or ‘83 or whether it was silver at the top in 1980 or whether it was some of the biotech stocks at the top earlier in the ‘90’s, when you get that kind of volatility you know that generally that’s associated with a top. The best you can hope for if you’re long is to look at some type of significant long term sideways action where the markets consolidate before moving higher or generally speaking allow that those have done their thing and we will have topped for years and years to come. I’m probably more of a subscriber to the latter theory.

Q: How big was your fund when you started and how much money does your company have under management now?

Paul Tudor Jones: Right now we have about five or six billion dollars under the management of several large traders including myself. Back in ‘83 we started with $300,000.

Q: Do you like managing so much more money?

Paul Tudor Jones: I don’t like managing it at all. The smaller it is the greater you can do because there is no slippage and greater liquidity.

Q: It was widely published that in 1987 you reportedly made between $80 million and $100 million – more than anybody on Wall Street. How did that make you feel?

Paul Tudor Jones: At the time, I was young enough to enjoy that. I was in my early 30’s and that was exciting, but the older you get you realize that at the end of the day the amount of money you have has absolutely zero bearing on how you feel about yourself and the quality of your life. It becomes a very shallow measure of a person’s worth. I have a great wife and four great kids now and that would be my crowning achievement.

Q: Is there more risk in the stock market now than ever before?

Paul Tudor Jones: Certainly in the stock market, there are some stocks with valuation levels that mankind has never seen before so one would think that they have a lot more risk. It’s funny, but I’m actually not the best person to ask about the stock market. You see, our company is just a group of 280 individuals, all of us are basically united under one purpose, and everybody has pretty much the same MO, young professionals with kids, generally very conservative. Really all my capital is tied up in this company, so on the one hand I think to myself my gosh the concept of owning stocks is anathema to me because of the fact that I always want to be liquid, so a lot of our investments typically are things with a very short lifespan like derivatives, not owning stocks. So as far as risk in the stock market, that’s not my core competency, so I’m really not a great person to ask.

Q: Can you comment on the life of your fund’s returns since you began investing?

Paul Tudor Jones: Our returns have definitely flattened out since the ‘80’s. But if you look at my risk adjusted returns, they’re very similar and I’m probably the same exact trader as I was 15 years ago. What’s different has been my own personal appetite for risk and volatility. I think that probably happens with a lot of people as they get older. Everything is a function of leverage, how much of a draw down are you willing to tolerate, how much leverage do you want to put on. When I was younger, I had much greater draw downs, much greater draw down frequency, much greater leverage. So again, I’m probably the exact same trader as I was 15 years ago, it’s just less risk, less return.

There are exceptions to the rule, but the normal progression of most traders that I’ve seen is that the older they get something happens. Sometimes they get more successful and therefore they take less risk. That’s something that as a company we literally sit and work with. That’s certainly something that I’ve had to come to grips with in particular over the past 12 to 18 months. You have to actively manage against your natural tendency to become more conservative. You do that because all of a sudden you become successful and don’t want to lose what you have and/or in my case you get married and have children and naturally, consciously or subconsciously, you become more conservative. If there’s one thing in our company that we probably will spend more time working on in the year 2000 than we ever spent historically, it’s that as a group we all came to be overly conservative and we need to leverage up more within our company and I’m probably the worst offender. So now I have a whole variety of portfolio measures that I sit down with every afternoon, to try to hit some benchmark leverage measures to make sure I deliver what my investors unequivocally deserve in terms of the opportunity to get the kinds of returns they’re used to.

Q: What are some perceptions and priorities of yours that have changed over the years?

Paul Tudor Jones: I think there’s a natural progression that everyone goes through. The older you get, the more you’ll realize that a quality life is one that has an extraordinary balance in it. The guy that’s working at 75 years of age and still running a company, that doesn’t have any appeal to me because I think his life is out of balance. If the only thing that he can find that’s that satisfying to him is being involved in a profession with something, I think you’ve got to have more balance. In my 20’s all I cared about was being financially successful and today I look to strive for a more balanced life. In that context though, when I come to work I’m as competitive as anybody you’ll meet and I clearly look forward to the day when I have the best performance of my peers, the macro hedge funds, for the year, which hopefully will be this year.

Q: What was the best and worst year you ever had?

Paul Tudor Jones: The worst year was probably 1993. I only returned 1.6%. Never had a down year. And my best years, well I fortunately cut my teeth in two great bear markets, the ‘87 bear market and the 1990 Japan bear market and there’s no question that that’s biased me a bit. I returned about 200% in 1987 and 80% or 90% in 1990. I worked 80 hours a week and clearly I’m not doing that without trying to be number one. All my friends are in the business, and I wish them all well, but everybody’s got a competitive spirit.

Q: Are you more naturally bearish or bullish?

Paul Tudor Jones: Bearish, I think. I would have difficulty asking anyone to pay 10 or 20 times earnings for my earnings capability for the rest of my life. I would think you’re crazy to do that even though it might be a great deal, so the concept of paying one-hundred-and-something times earnings for any company for me is just anathema. Having said that, at the end of the day, your job is to buy what goes up and to sell what goes down so really who gives a damn about PE’s? If it’s going up you’re supposed to be long it. But there’s no question that it’s just easier for me to leverage with some degree of conviction the short side of some markets.

Q: When are you going to retire?

Paul Tudor Jones: I have a son that just turned three and I would unequivocally continue to trade until he went to college. At that point I think I’d probably be airborne hunting and fishing all over the globe every day in my life. I don’t even necessarily need to be hunting and fishing, I just love to be out doors.

Q: What do you think is going to happen to your company when you do retire?

Paul Tudor Jones: I could get run over by a truck tomorrow morning and the company would go on and wouldn’t miss a beat. We’ve got the best business model there is on the street for doing this.

Q: Who are you going to vote for in the presidential election?

Paul Tudor Jones: I think the biggest issue facing America, unequivocally, is campaign finance reform. When you sit down and talk about gun control or charter schools or whatever, all those issues, it’s impossible to have politicians actually vote their conscience when they’re all unequivocally conflicted because of the fund raising necessities they have and the amount of money they take. Until you have campaign finance reform and term limits, we’re dealing with a whole group of elected officials who are incapable of making any independent and honest decisions. So McCain, Bradley, I’ll vote for either one of them. I’ll vote for any politician that’s going to sign the dotted line to get the money lenders out of the temple. I think that if you look at the 13,000 registered lobbyists in Washington, what chance do you or I have of having a voice in government unless you’re willing to write a big check? Because that’s what all those guys are doing. I’ll tell you from my conservation battles down in Florida. The entire sugar industry in Florida, which is destroying the Everglades, they have one business. Their business is not growing sugar. Their business is paying off every politician that they can see simply so that they can continue with a subsidy that does nothing but take money out of every Americans pocket and put it in theirs.

Q: You were close to getting that legislation to go your way, weren’t you?

Paul Tudor Jones: Right. And they spent forty some-odd-million dollars to fight us. Forty million dollars that they probably got through some extraordinarily inequitable and unfair and offensive subsidy that they have done an excellent job of paying off every politician in Congress for. Campaign finance for me is the key issue. It’s funny, McCain is a great example. He’s probably way too conservative for me, but I’d vote for the guy in a heart beat because there’s no doubt in my mind that he more so than anyone would probably go in and attack the vested interests there in Washington that completely distort and destroy our political process.

Q: Would you ever run for political office?

Paul Tudor Jones: No. I’ve got a family and kids and I couldn’t be away from them that much.

Q: Let’s play a word association game. I’ll say a word and you say whatever comes to mind.

Q: Technical analysis

Paul Tudor Jones: Made well over half the money that I’ve made in my lifetime.

Q: Fundamental Analysis

Paul Tudor Jones: Made the rest.

Q: Are you better at one or the other?

Paul Tudor Jones: Probably technical analysis.

Q: Market efficiency

Paul Tudor Jones: No such thing.

Q: Long Term Capital Management

Paul Tudor Jones: Icarus.

Q: Black Monday

Paul Tudor Jones: It was like watching a natural disaster from the sidelines. I was intimately involved in that day, but the macro implications of what was happening overwhelmed any personal considerations that I had.

Q: Warren Buffet

Paul Tudor Jones: His aversion to paying taxes made him a great investor.

Q: Kids

Paul Tudor Jones: The most fun you’ll ever have.

Q: Environment

Paul Tudor Jones: The second most fun you’ll ever have.

Q: The Internet

Paul Tudor Jones: A wonderful delivery mechanism that’s overhyped.

Q: Day Traders

Paul Tudor Jones: 95% losers.

Q: The University of Virginia

Paul Tudor Jones: The most balanced education a person can receive and I’m not talking about just academic education, but all the other touch points that go with that; character building, ethics, exposure, etc…

Q: Wall Street

Paul Tudor Jones: The last great frontier. I went there with nothing. You can go there with nothing and do whatever you want to do.

Q: What do you think you’ll be most remembered for?

Paul Tudor Jones: I don’t think anybody will remember me.

Q: What do you hope you’ll be remembered for?

Paul Tudor Jones: I think Teddy Roosevelt’s greatest legacy is the national parks system, so on a micro level anything that I could do to protect natural resources, I think, would be the best legacy that I could leave my kids.

Q: If you were writing a story about Paul Tudor Jones, what one question would you ask him?

Paul Tudor Jones: If you could do one thing differently, what would you do?

Q: And what’s the answer?

Paul Tudor Jones: When you look at the wealth creation in the Internet in the past decade, it would have required me to literally completely change my stripes and move over in a different world from macro analysis and trading a whole variety of instruments to going into building a business in a brave new world in the Internet. So I look back and I see the wealth creation that we’ve seen the past three years of which we’ve fortunately, derivatively been able to enjoy here at Tudor because we have our whole Boston office that’s dedicated towards private equity and that did an extraordinary job last year. But I guess, everyone that works on Wall Street today, particularly given our industry reliance on computers, knowing that that entire explosion occurred right under your nose, everyone has got to say, “My gosh, what if eight or 10 years ago I had made a decision to completely focus and be in the middle of technology? Instead of sitting in front of a screen, what if I had gotten on a plane and gone and played the venture capital game out in California every day?” I’d argue that many of the people that benefited from it probably were in the right place at the right time and got very fortunate and there probably aren’t but a handful of people that actually had the vision to go do it and the ones that actually did, I take my hat off to them and applaud. But I’ve always said, I’d just as soon be lucky as good and there are a whole variety of people that were just in the right place at the right time who did extraordinarily well and I’m happy for them. But I always do play the ‘what if’ game. What if you’d taken your full repertoire of talents and skills and been involved in that from day one? Could you have been Bill Gates or could you have been whatever empire builder there was?
 
Tony,

Those using purely mechanical, indicator, Pivot or Fib based approaches will base their game play on the recorded High/Low and will be appropriately suckered. But volume needs, well, VOLUME!!!

Agreed, and that is what they create.
We have a low priced stock, psychologically a low priced stock seems to make people lazy, and they don't really analyze their trade.
This stock is fully priced, or overpriced at its market capitalisation
Its not doing much
The specialist, needs to create trading volume.
He manipulates price, and in addition manipulates volume, just to provide some reality, trades some to a pal.
Price rises, and because its a low price, the % gain is impressive.
Keeps price rising on whatever volume is attracted, irrespective of overall market.
What should happen is that it will start to trigger different scans employed by traders.
Wait for a day that the market is weak, provide a pullback, but nothing scary, nothing to trigger any technical stops.
All those now watching, and waiting for a pullback, now jump on, volume starts to spike a little, price goes up.........
This goes on and on until his inventory is sold, or news comes out that spooks the new buyers, .................oh dear, the opening gap down is huge, ........more dead suckers.

This is a classic swing trader grave yard, possibly daytrades could get caught, if they are looking to short during the build up phase at previous resistance levels, but should escape with their shirts intact

So in answer, the volume is manipulated only in the early stage, price is manipulated constantly, the combination proves lethal to many.

cheers d998
 
Commitment.

It appears that commitments are most effective in changing a persons self- image when they and future behavior when they are active, public and effortful.
I notice that DBP utilises this psychological twist within his forum.

The Chinese utilised these concepts in the Korean POW camps. The basic gist was to organise essay competitions built around political comment, with a very small prize attached. They were looking for pro-communist comments. The small prize was in order that the participant could not provide his inner-self with the excuse that he wrote for the prize.

Freedman, later ran studies with children, and toys.
One group were forbidden to play with a specific toy, on threat of punishment, they in 89% disobeyed, when they thought they could get away with it.

The second group were told, regarding this specific toy, "it is wrong to play with this toy"
91% did not play with the toy.
Both these results held true 7 weeks later, when re-tested, and no instruction given.

Social scintists have determined that we accept inner responsibility for a behaviour when we think we have chasen to perform it ourselves, in the absence of strong outside pressures. A large reward is one such pressure, it may elicit the desired action, but will not get us to accept inner responsibility for the act. Consequently, we will not feel committed to it. The same is true of a strong threat.

What is the relevance to the market and trading?
The market provides the reward, and the punishment, and thus undermines any commitment in regards to a trading style, plan, or any number of habits required to be successful in the markets.
The result being an ever increasing confusion of ideas, methodologies, none being critically evaluated, tested, or even understood. The resultant lack of commitment, or consistency of action results in losses accumulating far more consistently than profits.

food for thought
d998
 
Very interesting slant on potential market 'motivators' and an innovative utilisation of psychological conditioning research. But is it totally valid for the entire set of Traders?

Choice (or commitment) is a very personal thing. Some will accept, even seek responsibility at the drop of a hat - others will refute it completely even when it is clearly supported by their peers/environment/society asa whole. In between those two extremes is a spectrum of contexts and situations in which responsibility can be shown to be a very subjective idea.

My guess (and it is a guess) is that those Traders who do fully understand and accept they are trading the market rather than in the market - and thus they can choose at any time to do something else instead - are likely to be less concerned with profit/loss and more with their performance in relation to their own personal criteria/goals. Be it consistency, discipline, focus, awareness etc.

I think this may be summed up as simply the difference between being on a personal journey and 'just' being a Trader.

If what you're doing isn't part of a greater whole - i.e. if just one thing (trading, stamp collecting, accountancy...) is the 'everything' you are - then you haven't given yourself the freedom to choose. That's when you allow the 'one thing' to have the power and control over you that you allude to above.

Sometimes it's simply just a case of standing back and looking through new eyes....
 
d998 - pushed for time so I'll keep it brief. You say down with technical/momentum/pattern trading and up with fundamental value trading/investing - correct?

If so, with that approach how would you trade index futures - decide on the fair value of all the constituents, or not attempt index futures at all?

Does a pure fundamental approach ignore sentiment? If so how can you play in a market where fundamentally cheap companies are kicked down and fundamentally expensive companies are shot to teh moon? Does your timeframe necessarily need to be very long term?

Maybe I misunderstood your posts - only skimmed them to be honest.
 
Tony,

But is it totally valid for the entire set of Traders?

I would very much doubt that it is applicable to all. There will always be anomalies, discrepancies, variables, within the community of traders and investors. It is simply a model that may explain to some degree the amount of failure in the markets.

Choice (or commitment) is a very personal thing. Some will accept, even seek responsibility at the drop of a hat - others will refute it completely even when it is clearly supported by their peers/environment/society asa whole. In between those two extremes is a spectrum of contexts and situations in which responsibility can be shown to be a very subjective idea.

Agreed, however, the "market" as a master is totally unconcerned with an individuals personal choice. The market displays all the human characteristics, as it is some meta-human, comprised of individuals, with varying amounts of influence, thus the "conditioning" instigated via the market can appear capricious, inconsistent, or rational and predictable, all on the turn of a hat.

With most "conditioning" exercises, the conditioner is consistent, as there is a desired outcome, or modification of behaviour, and or belief pattern.
The market by breaking this pattern, viz. rewarding stupid behaviour one day, punishing it the next, promotes the inconsistency seen in so many market participants.

This is totally logical, as the market although traded as a single entity, referred to as a single entity, is in fact anything but. Blatantly obvious you say, well yes, but why then treat the market with any respect as to your trading plan?
Yet technical traders do exactly this.


blackcab

d998 - pushed for time so I'll keep it brief. You say down with technical/momentum/pattern trading and up with fundamental value trading/investing - correct?

Correct.

If so, with that approach how would you trade index futures - decide on the fair value of all the constituents, or not attempt index futures at all?

Year.............................1948..............1953.............1958...........1963...............1968..............1971

Closing price.............15.20.............24.81............55.21..........75.02..............103.9..............100
Earned in year...........2.24................2.51..............2.89.............4.02................5.76................5.23
Average earn 3..........1.65...............2.44..............2.22..............3.63................5.37...............5.53
Dividend year.............0.93...............1.48..............1.75..............2.28................2.99..............3.10
Bond interest............2.77%............3.08%...........4.12%.........4.36%.............6.15%...........7.57%
Wholesale ind.........87.9.................92.7..............100.4..........105...................108.7............114.3
Ratios
Price/Earn................6.3....................9.9................18.4..............18.6..................18.0.............19.2
Price/3Earn.............9.2.....................10.2.............17.6...............20.7..................19.5.............18.1
3yrs E.Yield.............10.9%.............9.8%..............5.8%............4.8%..................5.15%.........5.53%
Dividend Yield........5.6%................5.5%..............3.3%............3.04%...............2.87%.........3.11%
StckE.Y/BondY.......3.96..................3.20...............1.41..............1.10..................0.80.............0.72
Div yield/BondY.....2.1....................1.8...................0.80..............0.70.................0.44..............0.41

Now, is this foolproof as far as indices go? Most certainly not, as Keynes says, markets can remain irrational longer than you can remain solvent, but it will provide a fundamental perspective to an index. The index is the Dow Jones.

Does a pure fundamental approach ignore sentiment? If so how can you play in a market where fundamentally cheap companies are kicked down and fundamentally expensive companies are shot to teh moon? Does your timeframe necessarily need to be very long term?

You don't ignore sentiment, far from it, you exploit sentiment at every opportunity. This however requires you to buy when everyone is selling, and sell when everyone is buying. On paper it looks and sounds easy. It isn't. And in many ways this is exactly what this thread is about. How can you understand, exploit, the aberrant psychology, if you are not aware of the influence it is exerting upon yourself?

food for thought
d998
 
Reciprocation and Liking.

Reciprocation is used very effectively as a device for ensuring another's compliance. The rule possesses awesome strength, often producing a "yes" response to a request that, except for an existing feeling of indebtedness, would have surely been refused.

See pg 148 - 150 of REMINISCENCES for an example.

Liking.............
Few would be surprised to learn that, as a rule, we most prefer to say yes to the requests of someone we know. Salesmen, total strangers, have been manipulating this basic truth to sell us.
Tupperware, the prime example, referrals, etc.

Again, read pg 150-153 of REMINISCENCES, for an example.

Forums, just like this, and many others exert their insiduous influence by use of the two above principals. It may not even be intentional, the outcome can very often be the same.
Trading, by and large, is an individual past-time, be it professional, or a hobby.

Trading education, whether from books, courses, chat sites, or from whatever source, ultimately must give way to individual analysis and thought.
Charts, technicals, to my mind will never eventuate to the latter, they are a perceived short-cut to wealth, and or a trade from home job.

Success, and the escape from the 95% statistic is to be found not within the chart, but in the ability to think.

food for thought
d998
 
Perhaps no one in the world of commodity trading has more lore attached to him than the legendary Richard Dennis, the founder, along with William Eckhardt, of the original Turtles and the system they established. Dennis's stunningly successful involvement with mechanical systems came about when he realized that whatever worked for him in his trading could be reduced to and defined as a trading rule. Today, he pretty much eschews the public investment arena, confining himself to an exploration of mechanical trading ideas for personal use. A self-described "computer-illiterate," he nonetheless has worked steadily with a handful of programmers for the last quarter century.



How's the current trading environment compared with your high-profile days?

It's 10 times harder than it used to be. It should be. The market's job is to derail the systems traders. Some of them are going to make money, but that can't go on forever.

Why not?

Because the market is changing more dramatically than it would have 15 or 20 years ago. I think that's because there are a lot more trend-followers involved in the market than before. It's a game where you're forever chasing your tail.

Anticipation doesn't have a lot of place in the mechanical trading world, does it? The adage is that systems react rather than predict, and traders should have no input at all once they're beyond a certain stage.

There's something to be said for the dumb bunny approach of "I'm just looking at numbers." I've done my share of talking myself out of systems that would have worked for years. You pays your money and you takes your chances. But ideas help if you're thinking about what the market is likely to be like two years from now.

Let me give you an example. It seems to be increasingly true that volatility screens are a good idea; the trades with the lowest volatility for trend-following are best. You might decide to push that envelope even further by taking only a quarter of the trades that are the least volatile instead of half. That part wouldn't be based on data, but on your idea that low volatility is good and the rest will be worse.

There's got to be something different about the future. Otherwise, everyone will make money, and we know that can't happen.

Any other reasons behind the change?

People should marvel at the difference between the returns of hedge funds and Commodity Trading Advisors (CTAs). The hedge funds have been much better over the years, with more money, which is a reason they should be worse. It's harder to perform with huge amounts under management. I think it's because hedge funds exploit trend-following systems to a large extent. A lot of the hedge funds are just trading on inside information. They're not trading. They're shooting fish in a barrel.

Think about what we had 20 or 25 years ago. The paradigm was that unknown information seeped into the market and gradually moved price.

You go to a currency market, and there's the same fundamental forces but you also have this tremendous flow of inside information. It isn't unknown inside information, but it's bureaucratic. It's bureaucrats at the Bundesbank telling the hedge fund guys what they're going to do. Now as a trend starts, it explodes immediately so that the trend-followers can't get in until it's over. It isn't slow. It isn't indirect. It's all at once.

System followers see a signal in financials that they think is the same as a soybean signal, but it's not. The structure of the trend changes. Let's face it, if you're running any kind of a fund, 90% of your trades are in interest rates and currencies. It throws all the data of more than 10 to 15 years ago into question because it was generated a different way.
 
A Marriage In Artificial Intelligence
by D.M. Wong, Ph.D.


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Can you really make better decisions with more information? Perhaps artificial intelligence has the answer. Find out how you can develop skills to gain control.
There are content-drenched websites such as TheStreet.com, CNBC.com, cbsmarketwatch. com, and so many more. Add to these all the subscription-based investing magazines and newsletters that are available. Can there be any doubt about our thirst for information? We tend to assume that people can make better decisions with more information. The logical extension is that people will make even better decisions with even more information. But is that true?

WHAT'S THE CUTOFF POINT?

Do people really make better choices with more information, or can too much information actually undermine the decision-making process?

Among economists, it is an axiom that choice is good and more choice is better. Giving buyers more choice means more -- and more intense -- competition, which lowers prices, raises quality and fosters innovation. In the end, workers are more productive, consumers are better off and the economy is bigger and more efficient. It's a lovely theory. ... Unfortunately, it turns out not to be true. Yes, up to a point, choice does enhance efficiency and consumer welfare. But at some point, there get to be so many options about what to buy or what career to go into or which mutual fund to invest in that many people make worse decisions than they would if they had fewer choices...
--Washington Post, September 10, 2004
We can only process a finite amount of information at any time. Once exceeded, information overload occurs. Studies have shown that as a decision-maker is initially given information, decision quality improves, but once the information level reaches saturation point, the decision-making quality begins to deteriorate. Thus, at some point, we become overloaded with information, and our decision-making abilities erode.
 
Trillions of investor dollars piled up and then gave way in a spectacular avalanche of greed and bad timing. Could it happen again? Sure -- and here's why.

By Jim Jubak

It’s March 10, a day when every investor wonders: Can it happen again?

Five years ago today, the Nasdaq Composite ($COMPX) hit its all-time closing high of 5,049. The next day, the index began a slide that took it down to 1,114 -- almost 80% -- on Oct. 9, 2002. Five years after the Bubble of 2000 broke, the Nasdaq Composite is still down almost 60%.

The damage to other measures of stock market value isn't quite as graphic, but it's painful enough. The Dow Jones Industrial Average ($INDU), which has flirted with 11,000 for the last week, posted a record high close at 11,723 on Jan. 14, 2000. By Oct. 9, 2002, the Dow would drop to 7,286, a loss of nearly 40%, before beginning a steady recovery. On Tuesday, the Dow closed at 10,913, 7% below its 2000 high.

No wonder investors are obsessed with bubbles. Is there a housing bubble? A consumer-debt bubble? A U.S.-dollar bubble? A bond-market bubble? A stock-market bubble?

There’s still too much money sloshing around the globe, leverage in the bond and currency markets is still frighteningly high. And, as Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan bemoaned recently, investors are far too complacent about making high-risk investments at very modest risk premiums. All those conditions are necessary precursors to bubbles and the nasty plunges that pop them.Social Security.
Are you worried, too?
Our special report.



Five years after the bubble burst in 2000, we don’t know enough even to identify the specific part of the financial markets that might blow up next. But what we have learned about bubbles -- some of it since the last one burst -- argues that many investors are worried about the wrong sources of potential trouble. The still-young study of bubbles explains:
Why the housing market and the consumer-credit markets aren't the bubbles most likely to burst,


And why the place to watch for the next bubble is the hedge-fund industry and the derivatives market.
Bubbles, according to current theory, aren’t bubbles at all. They're actually cascades, something like an avalanche or a pile of sand.

The slippery slope
Cascades are structures that are stable -- until suddenly they're not. Snow piles up in a mountain pass, snowflake by snowflake, day after day. And each day the pile of snow doesn't cascade down the slopes to bury unlucky skiers. Until, one day, of course, the snow doesn't stay put and roars down the mountain.

You can see the same kind of behavior in a pile of sand or a tower of blocks. Or in the financial markets. In 2000, for example, the price of Amazon.com (AMZN, news, msgs) went up and up and up, with each day adding another brick to the wobbly tower, until one day the tower came tumbling to the ground.

The mathematics of systems like these is incredibly complex, but we can abstract a few basic rules that explain why and when cascades happen.

First, there's the rate at which new snow or sand is added. Logically, you'd guess that the faster material is added, the faster a stable pile will turn into an avalanche. Actually, it’s even worse than that: Adding snow or sand twice as fast will create a cascade in less than half the time.

Second, there's the physical stickiness/slipperiness of the material of the pile. Snow slides on snow more easily when a warm sun has added a certain amount of melt water to the mix. The frequency of avalanches goes up during melt periods.

Third, the slope of the pile (or of the mountain under it) influences not just how quickly a stable snowfield will turn into an avalanche, but how fast it will move downhill, how much momentum it will pick up and how far down the hill the avalanche will move.

3 rules of bubbles
Turn these three rules of snow into rules of money to see how financial bubbles behave.

1. Think of the money being added to a financial system as equal to the snow falling on a potential avalanche. Add money to a market at a slow enough rate, and buyers and sellers have a chance to adjust their pricing expectations over time. Add money too quickly, however, and the high prices created by that flood of money turn into high returns that suck in even more money.

In retrospect, it’s clear that huge injections of liquidity into the financial markets -- in 1998, to keep the meltdown of Long Term Capital from turning into a global problem and, in 1999, to avert any potential liquidity problems caused by the Y2K computer glitch -- supplied the fuel for the bubble that burst in 2000. Today, global liquidity is still high, thanks to easy-money policies designed to keep consumer growth chugging along and to keep currencies such as the yuan and the yen from soaring against the U.S. dollar.

2. Think about the stickiness/slipperiness of the different kinds of money used in specific financial markets. Mortgage money, I'd argue, is very sticky -- it's relatively hard to move around. A foreclosure isn't instantaneous, for example. To get mortgage money to move easily, it has to first be turned into a derivative (an investment that derives its profit potential from the volatility of an underlying stock, bond or index) that can be traded electronically.

Derivatives can be traded in the blink of an eye, often faster than stocks and bonds, so quickly that buyers and sellers have almost no chance to actually think before a buy/sell decision gets executed. Much of the time, computers do the work, taking advantage of tiny disparities in price to shift billions around the globe.

Derivatives markets never catch their breath. By the time a human actually sees a trade, it can be very old news. The momentum feeds on itself: The faster that trades are made, the faster prices move up or down, and on and on.

3. Think of leverage as the slope of the mountain under the potential avalanche. The more leverage in a financial market, the steeper the slope of the mountain and the faster a financial avalanche can move downhill. That’s because the more buyers use borrowed money to increase their profit if markets go up, the quicker they have to sell when a market heads south. Leverage of 10 to 1 isn’t unknown in the world of hedge funds. It doesn’t take much of a downward move to wipe out the hedge fund’s capital in such an investment and bring nervous creditors hammering on the door.

The trouble spots
If you apply these rules to the financial markets, you wind up with a bubble-potential index for specific sectors of the financial markets.

Low bubble potential: housing and consumer debt. Yes, consumer and mortgage debt are at historically high levels, and the payments are affordable to many consumers and homeowners only as long as interest rates stay low. But these markets just don’t combine high-slipperiness/high-leverage characteristics in a way that would produce a high-velocity cascade of the kind we call a bubble. If folks can’t meet their credit card bills or mortgage obligations, the default that triggers the sale of assets takes place one household at a time over weeks, if not months.

Leverage in these financial products is high if you think of the amount of money consumers have borrowed against their underlying equity, but the leverage is relatively small if measured against what a creditor would be able to recover in the case of default. Asset prices could certainly decline in the housing market from current levels, and a consumer debt crunch would slow the economy measurably, but these are events that unfold much more slowly than the quick bubble burst of 2000.

Moderate bubble potential: the U.S. dollar market. The currency markets certainly meet the thresholds for slipperiness and leverage, but the landscape is full of buffers that are likely to slow down any cascade. Those buffers take the shape of the world’s central banks, which have a vested interest in the orderly workings of the currency markets, have strong motivation to buy when others are selling to keep the markets orderly and have the billions of dollars in cash needed for meaningful intervention. It’s not that some currency-trading hedge fund couldn’t blow up, but it’s likely that any such explosion would result in quick and massive central bank action to limit the damage.

High bubble potential: the hedge-fund and derivative markets. Both specialize in highly slippery kinds of money with high leverage potential. And because the hedge-fund and derivative markets are so lightly regulated and so difficult to track from the outside, a downward move here could develop considerable momentum before anyone noticed. Intervention by the Fed would be almost certain. But the derivatives market is so large that the Fed -- with the U.S. Treasury and Mint essentially at its disposal -- might not have the resources to stop a slide.

Why should you care? Hedge funds and derivatives markets borrow their money from banks. (They're on the hook for some part of the more than $197 trillion in derivatives outstanding as of June 2004, according to the Bank of International Settlements -- the trouble is, no one knows what part.) When a trade goes bad and a borrower defaults, somebody -- quite possibly one of the big banks that dominate this market -- is left holding the bag. In that case, a bank not only lacks the money to make new loans, it may have to call in old ones.

All the big banks are exposed. And if the wrong big bank gets hit, the whole financial system starts to tremble.

The possibility that a hedge fund could blow up or that some derivative trade could unwind in a spectacularly disastrous fashion isn't the kind of problem that keeps most investors up at night right now. We tend to imagine that the next disaster will resemble the last one.

Consumer debt, rising interest rates, the national deficit and the falling dollar occupy our imaginations because they're highly visible and easy to grasp. But the problems in these areas aren’t likely to turn into bubbles and busts.

It's the grinding problems and our failure to address them -- and not some 2000-style bubble and bust -- that will, in the long run, determine our and our children’s prosperity.
 
Associated Press
Buffett's Tips: Don't Overtrade, or Panic
Saturday March 12, 10:31 pm ET
By Meg Richards, AP Business Writer
Billionaire Buffett's Tips: Be Fearful When Others Are Greedy, Greedy When Others Fearful


NEW YORK (AP) -- One of the most widely read dispatches in the investment world may be Warren Buffett's annual letter to the shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway. In this year's edition, the man known as the Oracle of Omaha offered two tips for small investors: Don't overtrade, and don't abandon ship just because everyone else is jumping.



Looking back over the last 35 years, Buffett noted that American business has delivered terrific results, which should have made it easy for investors to earn juicy returns. But for many, it hasn't been so simple.

"All they had to do was piggyback corporate America in a diversified, low-expense way," Buffett wrote. "An index fund that they never touched would have done the job. Instead, many investors have had experiences ranging from mediocre to disastrous."

Buffett blamed investor missteps on three factors: high costs, often because investors trade excessively or spend too much on management fees; poor decisions based on tips and fads rather than solid research; and untimely exits from investment positions, usually after periods of stagnation or decline.

"Investors should remember that excitement and expenses are their enemies," Buffett told shareholders. "And if they insist on trying to time their participation in equities, they should try to be fearful when others are greedy and greedy only when others are fearful."

It's a strategy that has worked well for Buffett's Omaha, Neb.-based conglomerate, which has posted an average annual gain of 21.9 percent since 1965 -- better than twice the return delivered by the Standard & Poor's 500 over the same period.

Berkshire and Buffett have had great success when it comes to "being greedy only when others are fearful." But maintaining such a strategy can be very hard, said Michael Mauboussin, chief investment strategist at Legg Mason Capital Management in Baltimore, and an adjunct professor at the Columbia Graduate School of Business.

"That's very plain, common sense advice," Mauboussin said. "But it's a very difficult thing to do."

Part of the difficulty comes from the fact that most major financial institutions -- and the financial media that cater to them -- focus on short-term performance. For small investors, having the conviction to resist being part of that group can be a huge challenge. But research has shown that portfolios with lower turnover rates perform far better in the long run. Less trading means lower costs, but also requires a strong stomach.

"It ... runs counter to the American way. In most endeavors, the more active you are, the harder you work at it, the better you do. Activity is equated to success," Mauboussin said. "But in investing, it's really not. Most of the great investors make very few decisions. It's kind of counter to the way most people think and operate."

Using a value-focused philosophy, Buffett has taken a long-term approach to building Berkshire's broadly diversified portfolio of businesses, which includes MidAmerican Energy Holdings, auto insurer GEICO, reinsurer General Re, aircraft fractional ownership subsidiary NetJets, manufactured homebuilder Clayton Homes, carpet manufacturer Shaw Industries, apparel maker Fruit of the Loom, Nebraska Furniture Mart and Dairy Queen.

Berkshire's nearly $38 billion stock portfolio includes a 12.1 percent ownership stake in American Express Co., and significant positions in The Coca-Cola Co., Gillette Co. and H&R Block Inc. On a weighted basis, the company had held its positions in these stocks for about 12 1/2 years. Berkshire also owns 18.1 percent of The Washington Post Co., an $11 million investment made in 1974 that is now worth an estimated $1.7 billion.

The company's underlying value is reflected in the price of its shares, which can be had in two flavors; A-class shares, which closed Friday at $90,625, down $75.00 as the market swooned over economic data, or B-class shares -- 1/30th of the size -- which slipped $6.00 to $3,001. Either will serve as a ticket to Berkshire's widely attended annual meeting in Omaha next month, and get you an 8 percent discount on GEICO car insurance, one of the many businesses Buffett plugs in his letter.

Berkshire's long-term performance, contrasted against last year's return, provides a lesson in itself. Despite his many successes, Buffett apologized in his 40th letter to shareholders for Berkshire's "lackluster" 10.5 percent book-value gain, which fell short of the S&P's 10.9 percent return for 2004.

One of the more interesting things about the letter was what it was missing, said Dreyfus Neenan, senior analyst at Morningstar Inc. Berkshire ended the year with $43 billion in cash equivalents, "not a happy position," Buffett wrote. The problem was that Buffett and his team, who love buying great companies at bargain prices, found a dearth of acquisition opportunities, and very few attractive securities to buy.

"Warren Buffett, being Warren Buffett, you know that's burning him up. He wants to make money," Neenan said. "So you have to ask yourself, if one of the best investors in history can't find any attractive investments, what does that say for the rest of us?"

Still, Neenan and others noted, most of us don't have the problem of putting $43 billion to work. While Berkshire's lack of acquisitiveness in 2004 could be seen as an indication that the private equity markets are a bit frothy, a number of stocks still hold appeal for value-minded investors with less money to spend. In Morningstar's database of 1,500 stocks, 40 have won a five-star rating, based on their attractive valuations. The question is, if you invest in these, will you be able to apply a buy-and-hold strategy with a Buffett-like discipline?

Doing so doesn't necessarily mean never revisiting your position. Buffett is critical of himself for not selling more stocks in 1999 and 2000, when he was questioning market valuations. There's a lesson in that too, Neenan said.

"If you have the will power to just sit tight, you can do big things," he said. "But be wise enough to look back at your past decisions and evaluate how they perform. A lot of people tend to bury their losses and forget about them. But even this guy is always re-evaluating, he's always looking back and trying to learn."
 
Feedback on various factors associated with trading decision making

Thank you once again for participating in this research. We promised you feedback, so here it is! Although this has taken some time to arrive, please understand that the analysis and gathering all the information to return to you has been interrupted with so many different unforeseen factors. We apologise if this feedback has been delayed longer than you expected.

So when you look at the results, please also consider what may have changed for you since then. When we say average scores, this means for all participants (or ‘sample’) involved in our study. In total we had 242 people respond to at least 5 or more of the 13 questionnaires analysed and described below. So if you don’t have scores against some of the items below, this means that you did not finish this questionnaire. Although we started with 18 questionnaires, we have had to discontinue analysis of the last 5, which dealt with risk and loss aversion, because of lack of response from many.

Details of your peers are shown in the following table.

TABLE 3.1 - Webstudy Participant Demographics
Variable Details Numbers Percentages
Gender Male
Female 195
47 81%
19%
Age 20-30
31-40
41-50
51-60
61-70
Over 70 23
50
83
59
20
4 9.62%
20.92%
34.73%
24.69%
8.37%
1.67%
Experience (in years) < 2
2-3
3-5
5-7
7-10

10-20
> 20 39
31
39
51
24

24
34

76.03 %



23.97 %
Occupational Group Computing / Software
Teaching / Academic
Engineering
Retired/Unemployed
Trader / Investor
Funds Mgr/Broker
Finance
Student
Building
Health
Management
Other
Self-Employed
Unknown 11
8
11
19
26
8
11
13
6
13
20
31
19
46 4.55 %
3.31 %
4.55 %
7.85 %
10.74 %
3.31 %
4.55 %
5.37 %
2.48 %
5.37 %
8.26 %
12.81 %
7.85 %
19.01 %




Preference for Intuition or Analysis
Self-efficacy means what we think of our own ability to be able to do something. In this research, this section has to do with two components: our self-perception about how good we are using either intuition (or ‘gut feeling’), and analysis (or ‘reasoning’). There are also suggestions in the research that our ideas about how good we are in decision-making may affect the levels of stress and confidence we feel during a decision event. These will be discussed later.

Intuition is the immediate knowing of something without the conscious use of reasoning. There is now considerable evidence that intuition is used by most people during decision-making. Researchers use the term “educated intuition” to explain that an expert’s non-rational problem solving is useful. Definitions tend to acknowledge three commonalities: (1) intuition comes from non-consciousness and one becomes conscious or aware, (2) information is processed in a holistic manner, and (3) the intuition is usually accompanied by feelings. Items in the webstudy on intuition include those like ‘I trust my initial feelings about people and situations’, and ‘I am best at solving problems through intuition, not reasoning’.

Average Expert Average Novice Your score
Prefer Intuition 3.85 3.83 3.79

Rational thinking or analysis leads to us to a conclusion that is most likely correct, using whatever knowledge we have. Given this knowledge, a person takes a rational action which will then lead to the desired end. It consists of detecting irregularities in the world and applying principles to predict the future in some way. In the share market decisions are based on two types of analysis: fundamental or technical. The main argument against use of technical analysis in share market decision-making is that traders who use this method attempt to predict the future performance of a stock by looking back at its past (Whittaker, 1994). An example of rational / analysis questions is ‘I am good at finding answers to problems by analysing details’

Average Expert Average Novice Your score
Prefer Analysis 4.88 4.87 6.62
Emotional Awareness
Self-awareness explains how perceptions, explanations, beliefs and emotions work together in a bid to make sense of the world and ‘reality’. Being aware of our emotions is another aspect of awareness of self. Recent research evidence points to emotion not being separate and distinct from our thinking, so that being aware of one’s emotions indicates a cognitive component to emotion. That is, perceiving and being able to analyse, distinguish and describe our emotions requires us to think about what is happening within our body, and how we are feeling in response to the environment. Some items included in the webstudy are “I am very aware of my feelings” and “I use my feelings to determine whether to trust another person.”

Average Expert Average Novice Your score
Awareness of emotions 2.81 2.87 3.10

Negative emotions
Emotions are related to value judgements about our selves, and play a significant part in our lives and decision-making. High scores in negative emotions indicate you often feel subjective distress and unpleasurable or aversive mood states including disgust, contempt, anger, guilt, fear, and nervousness. Words indicating negative emotions in this research include ‘irritable’, ‘distressed’, ‘guilty’, ‘hostile’, and ‘jittery’.

Average Expert Average Novice Your score
Negative emotions 1.77 2.02 1.50

Positive emotions
This is the extent to which an individual feels alert, active and enthusiastic. There are some indications that positive affect is significantly related to intuition. The higher the score the more positive you feel. Examples of words included ‘interested’, ‘excited’, ‘proud’ and ‘strong’.

Average Expert Average Novice Your score
Positive emotions 3.87 3.71 4.60

Time Pressures
The share market, once it opens every working day, is a constant activity of brokers and traders having to make quick decisions or face possible negative consequences. However, time pressures are related to feelings of stress. Research has found that when people feel time pressure, they tend to use less analysis. But when there are big payoffs for making quality decisions, decision-makers will tend to use more analysis. On the other hand, when time is limited and the outcome is unclear this leads many people to be more intuitive, using non-rational methods. When scores are high that means you feel higher levels of time pressure. So it shows below that novices tend to feel higher levels of time pressure than experts (on average). One example of these questions was “I get flustered if I have to make decisions in a hurry.”

Average Expert Average Novice Your score
Time pressures 2.80 3.37 1.00

Satisfaction with amount of information available
Decision-makers should spend a considerable portion of their decision-making time on searching for information for four reasons: to design or find new courses of action or develop choice options; to summarise credible evidence to construct a causal model of the current situation; to infer relevant values; and to search for analogous instances or patterns. Psychologists argue that thorough information searches in decision-making are important for finding out what alternatives exist, what the consequences are to these alternatives, and how the decision-maker can avoid negative outcomes. Information searches are not always thoroughly completed, however, even by experts: It has been found that practitioners are frequently unaware of relevant knowledge to their problem environment. So if you scored higher than average this indicates that you are satisfied with the amount of information available to you to make good quality decisions. One example of this type of question was “I have enough information to make a successful trading decision.”

Average Expert Average Novice Your score
Information Satisfaction 5.72 5.07 7.00

Risk and Uncertainty
The share market is a high-risk industry because there is a possibility of considerable financial gains and losses: large sums of money can be lost or gained in a matter of seconds. Two people may perceive exactly the same situation either as an opportunity or a threat, depending on their experience with required tasks and resultant outcomes, emotions about the experience, or motivation to develop mastery in that situation. You were asked to respond to each item, indicating your feelings about the market, such as ‘I have negative feelings about it’, or ‘I think it offers opportunities’.

Average Expert Average Novice Your score
Risk / Threat 2.81 3.15 2.80
Risk / Opportunity 5.60 5.33 5.80

Feeling Stressed (while trading now)
Psychological stress is an unpleasant emotional state instigated by feelings of threat to personal welfare, while task stress is peculiar to the decision problem itself. Excessive feelings of stress and even panic may have a detrimental affect on all aspects of decision-making, causing decision-makers to make responses to problem situations without careful analysis, although experts do not normally allow these emotions to drive their decision-making. Time stress is one of the major constraints in the decision-maker’s ability to make effective and accurate decisions, and reduces the consistency of decision-makers’ performance, causing them to behave more erratically. This has been found to be significant for many professional groups, including managers, fire-fighters, maintenance engineers, general practitioners and naval officers. An example was “I am nervous about making the right decision.”

Average Expert Average Novice Your score
Feeling Stressed 2.95 3.34 1.86

Feeling Confident (in trading now)
Feeling confident is important in decision making. However, it has been found that some people are overconfident in their decision-making. Research into confidence and accuracy has provided two main conclusions. First, confidence and accuracy are reasonably related; that is, people are generally more accurate about answers in which they have greater confidence. Second, people are generally not very accurate, even when they are confident. So, if you are overconfident, this might mean you may have spent insufficient time on defining the problem, on searching for relevant and accurate information, and determining the consequences of alternatives. Researchers have found that this has an impact upon the quality of the decision. An example in this survey was “I feel confident I am able to make good decisions now.”


Average Expert Average Novice Your score
Feeling Confident 5.39 4.88 7.23

Use of Intuition or Analysis during a Decision
You were asked to indicate, on a scale of 1-10, the actual use of both analysis and intuition during the decision-making process. As this was designed to provide straight-forward interpretive assessments, single item measures were used. Here I used a Likert scale ranging from 1 = Very Little to 10 = Extensively.

Average Expert Average Novice Your score
Use of Analysis 7.22 6.57 8.94
Use of Intuition 4.71 4.75 1.00

Decision Accuracy
Decision accuracy was determined through nine predictions you made of market products (three market products predicted for next day, 7 days from now, and 30 days from now), which were later checked against actual market prices. Comparisons were made between these predictions with the actual market prices, and stated as absolute differences, then converted to percentages, and averaged across the nine decisions. Because lower scores indicated better predictions and therefore better decision making, these scores were then reversed by subtracting them from 100. So, the higher the score, the more accurate you were. Often I could not determine a score if you submitted a futures contract, since these last only a short while before they can be accessed. I apologise if your score does not appear below – as you can imagine, I tried my hardest, for my own sake as well as yours!

Average Expert Average Novice Your score
Decision Accuracy 93.44 94.39 98.67

Decision Confidence
Confidence was measured by asking, after each prediction was made, how confident you were about your prediction being accurate or correct. Choices ranged from 0 = No Confidence, 5 = Moderate Confidence, and 10 = Extreme Confidence.

Average Expert Average Novice Your score
Decision Confidence 5.33 4.87 8.00

Expertise
An ‘expert’ is “one whose decisions ordinarily turn out better than those of the typical decision-maker”, though researchers suggest there are further important criteria, such as perceiving meaningful patterns in their discipline, being fast at performing tasks with little error, and having developed automatic skills which free up their short-term memory. In the webstudy research it was determined that experts were those with a combination of factors: had more than 10 years of experience in the market, had undergone much industry training, had made more than 50% return on investment, and had made more than 100 trades.

You will notice that there is very little difference between novices and experts on most of the areas listed above. The only really significant ones were Negative Emotions, Time Pressures, Feeling Stressed and Confident, Use of Analysis, and Decision Accuracy and Confidence (in your predictions). Some of this was unexpected!! Yet, from interviews I held with experts in Sydney and Brisbane, I know that they are more interested in risk management strategies than in forecasting trends and prices. This might be one reason why they also feel less stress. We also tried this result with just one criterion for experts: return on investment, and the results were very similar. These findings have revealed some interesting results which can be used in other areas of high-risk decision making, and will be presented in conference and journal articles.

If you have any concerns with or have any ideas about the information in this profile, feel free to email me. I will be completing my PhD in the next few months, so may not have a UQ Business School email address after the middle of the year. I wish you all the very best in your trading and in your experience of abundance.


Thanks again for your participation in this research –
we hope you found this exercise interesting and useful.
 
Well that came out a bit wibbly wobbly.
These were the results of a research project on trading that I participated in a little while ago.

As with most research, the conclusion was, more research required.
 
Top