Dentalfloss
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Trading with point and figure
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Dentalfloss
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excellent
Dentalfloss
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took the dax with it
even better
even better
Dentalfloss
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stop tight..in minor supp
Dentalfloss
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gbp crosses
excellent movement from our rez we marked earlier
excellent movement from our rez we marked earlier
Dentalfloss
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To suggest that the outlook is extraordinarily complex would be an understatement, I have divided this run of thoughts on potential risks and hurdles into Financial Sector, political and macro-economic sections:
a) Financial markets sector risks
To start with let me borrow from Bank of England (BoE) Chief Economist Andy Haldane’s speech from 2014 about how the new regulatory framework has, and might change the nature of financial market risk, which seems even more apposite than ever. I would argue that the sharp moves seen overnight are roughly equally attributable to the ‘surprise’ of the Leave vote, as the regulatory and G7 monetary policy backdrop. It is not only a very sound analysis, but also free of the hyperbole that bedevils digital media and other commentators discourse. In that respect, it is worth noting that the FTSE100 index is still trading within its range for 2016 (sharp movements, but still essentially a sideways churn). GBP and interest rate markets have shifted to a lower range, relative to 2016 year to date, but this is not the sort of dislocation seen on Black Wednesday or after the Lehman / Global Financial Collapse. An interest rate cut will likely only be deployed by the BoE if ‘worst fears’ are realized, either in economic and/or financial market turmoil terms. The BoE will be far more focused on ensuring that there are no bank balance sheet problems that crystallize; this may however neglect medium to long-term risks for the pension and investment fund sectors due to a protracted period of financial repression and a mounting ‘income deficit’ for the sector.
“One of the likely consequences of the crisis, and the resulting regulatory response, is that the financial system will reinvent itself. Financial activity will migrate outside the banking system. And with that move, risk may itself change shape and form. What previously had been credit and maturity mismatch risk on the balance sheet of the banking system may metastasize into market and illiquidity risk on the balance sheets of non-banks. This could have important implications for the stability of the financial system and the broader economy.
With more activity outside the banking system, and with the banking system itself better protected, the financial system and economy may become less prone to the low-frequency, high-cost banking crises seen in the past. But that is not the end of the story. Risk, like energy, tends to be conserved not dissipated, to change its composition but not its quantum. So it is possible the financial system may exhibit a new strain of systemic risk – a greater number of higher-frequency, higher-amplitude cyclical fluctuations in asset prices and financial activity, now originating on the balance sheets of mutual funds, insurance companies and pension funds. These cyclical fluctuations could in turn be transmitted to, and mirrored, in greater cyclical instabilities in the wider economy.
In this world, it would be very difficult for monetary, regulatory and operational policy to beat an orderly retreat. It is likely that regulatory policy would need to be in a constant state of alert for risks emerging in the financial shadows, which could trip up regulators and the financial system. In other words, regulatory fine-tuning could become the rule, not the exception. In this world, macro-prudential policy to lean against the financial cycle could become more, not less, important over time. With more risk residing on non-bank balance sheets that are marked-to-market, it is possible that cycles in financial assets would be amplified, not dampened, relative to the old world. Their transmission to the wider economy may also be more potent and frequent. The demands on macro-prudential policy, to stabilise these financial fluctuations and hence the macro-economy, could thereby grow.
from Marc Ostwald
a) Financial markets sector risks
To start with let me borrow from Bank of England (BoE) Chief Economist Andy Haldane’s speech from 2014 about how the new regulatory framework has, and might change the nature of financial market risk, which seems even more apposite than ever. I would argue that the sharp moves seen overnight are roughly equally attributable to the ‘surprise’ of the Leave vote, as the regulatory and G7 monetary policy backdrop. It is not only a very sound analysis, but also free of the hyperbole that bedevils digital media and other commentators discourse. In that respect, it is worth noting that the FTSE100 index is still trading within its range for 2016 (sharp movements, but still essentially a sideways churn). GBP and interest rate markets have shifted to a lower range, relative to 2016 year to date, but this is not the sort of dislocation seen on Black Wednesday or after the Lehman / Global Financial Collapse. An interest rate cut will likely only be deployed by the BoE if ‘worst fears’ are realized, either in economic and/or financial market turmoil terms. The BoE will be far more focused on ensuring that there are no bank balance sheet problems that crystallize; this may however neglect medium to long-term risks for the pension and investment fund sectors due to a protracted period of financial repression and a mounting ‘income deficit’ for the sector.
“One of the likely consequences of the crisis, and the resulting regulatory response, is that the financial system will reinvent itself. Financial activity will migrate outside the banking system. And with that move, risk may itself change shape and form. What previously had been credit and maturity mismatch risk on the balance sheet of the banking system may metastasize into market and illiquidity risk on the balance sheets of non-banks. This could have important implications for the stability of the financial system and the broader economy.
With more activity outside the banking system, and with the banking system itself better protected, the financial system and economy may become less prone to the low-frequency, high-cost banking crises seen in the past. But that is not the end of the story. Risk, like energy, tends to be conserved not dissipated, to change its composition but not its quantum. So it is possible the financial system may exhibit a new strain of systemic risk – a greater number of higher-frequency, higher-amplitude cyclical fluctuations in asset prices and financial activity, now originating on the balance sheets of mutual funds, insurance companies and pension funds. These cyclical fluctuations could in turn be transmitted to, and mirrored, in greater cyclical instabilities in the wider economy.
In this world, it would be very difficult for monetary, regulatory and operational policy to beat an orderly retreat. It is likely that regulatory policy would need to be in a constant state of alert for risks emerging in the financial shadows, which could trip up regulators and the financial system. In other words, regulatory fine-tuning could become the rule, not the exception. In this world, macro-prudential policy to lean against the financial cycle could become more, not less, important over time. With more risk residing on non-bank balance sheets that are marked-to-market, it is possible that cycles in financial assets would be amplified, not dampened, relative to the old world. Their transmission to the wider economy may also be more potent and frequent. The demands on macro-prudential policy, to stabilise these financial fluctuations and hence the macro-economy, could thereby grow.
from Marc Ostwald
Dentalfloss
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second part of Marc Ostwald stuff
be in a constant state of alert for risks emerging in the financial shadows, which could trip up regulators and the financial system. In other words, regulatory fine-tuning could become the rule, not the exception. In this world, macro-prudential policy to lean against the financial cycle could become more, not less, important over time. With more risk residing on non-bank balance sheets that are marked-to-market, it is possible that cycles in financial assets would be amplified, not dampened, relative to the old world. Their transmission to the wider economy may also be more potent and frequent. The demands on macro-prudential policy, to stabilise these financial fluctuations and hence the macro-economy, could thereby grow.
In this world, central banks’ operational policies would be likely to remain expansive. Non-bank counterparties would grow in importance, not shrink. So too, potentially, would more exotic forms of collateral taken in central banks’ operations. Market-making, in a wider class of financial instruments, could become a more standard part of the central bank toolkit, to mitigate the effects of temporary market illiquidity droughts in the non-bank sector.” (http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Documents/speeches/2014/speech751.pdf)
b) The political road map
The political backdrop is very difficult to second guess.
Domestically, the ‘bookies’ have installed Boris Johnson as favourite to succeed Cameron, but bookies make odds on the basis of the weight of money flows (i.e. book risk), it is not therefore a mathematical probability, but rather more akin to hedging exposure. Johnson certainly has the ego and the ambition, but has a significant number of detractors. Some effort will have to be made to mend the damage inflicted by the Tory party divides during the referendum. Theresa May, who kept her head ‘below the parapet’ during the referendum, appears to be best placed to offer herself as the re-unifying candidate, particularly if she were to select a ‘Leave’ protagonist for the position of Chancellor of the Exchequer (Finance Minister). The outcome may also be influenced by the extent of Labour Party disarray and divisions, with a challenge to Mr Corbyn as leader of the Parliamentary Labour Party (N.B. not the overall party) mooted for Monday/Tuesday, which the more Machiavellian members of the Tories might seek to exploit.
The EU picture is as, if not more complex. Spain’s general election on Sunday will be closely watched, and doubtless over-analysed in terms of what it implies in broader terms for the future of the EU and Eurozone. But with no disrespect meant to the people of Spain, it is developments in the larger founding members of the Common Market – France, Germany and Italy – which will be decisive. Italy faces its referendum on major constitutional reform (‘Italicum’) in October, on which PM Renzi’s future hangs, with the Lega Nord also calling for a UK style in/out referendum, and the politically maturing 5* Movement (aka M5S) having scored major victories in the recent municipal elections. The precarious position of public sector finances without the prospect of a relatively stable govt, and the acutely woeful state of Italian bank balance sheets are the ticking time bombs, if Renzi were to be unseated. However the biggest risk lie with France and Germany, whose often diametrically opposed views about the future of the Eurozone and the EU, and accompanying generally unspoken distrust, have spawned much of the gridlock and ugly compromises, which have seriously undermined Eurozone/EU policy making for the past 20 years. French presidential elections are due for 2017 and a German general election by October 2017. If Article 50 negotiations are to be speeded up, then a conclusion will have to be reached well in advance (seemingly improbable), or only after both have concluded. Initial reactions from the unpopular and domestically very beleaguered M Hollande appeared to put the onus on Germany to get the EU/Eurozone onto a ‘more even keel’, while Frau Merkel voiced non-confrontational platitudes, which had all the hallmarks of Merkel’s character typical over thought and tortured indecision.
c) Economic Outlook
The UK economy has performed much better in Q2, both relative to Q1 and above all proved to be more robust than the vast majority of forecasters had been projecting, both thanks to solid consumer spending, as well as a pick-up in the goods producing sector, ironically in no small part due to better EU / Eurozone demand. While there is always talk that a weaker GBP , above all vs. the EUR, should provide a boost to export demand, the facts suggest otherwise. The ‘boost’ from the 2008/09 GBP slide saw the Current Account deficit widen to a post WWII record of 7.0%. As with Germany, the history of the post Bretton Woods era underlines that export demand has proved rather inelastic and unresponsive to local currency moves, while inflation has been far more sensitive to the sharp FX moves, above all sustained weakness vs. the USD. Major Business Investment decisions will inevitably be hampered by the Article 50 negotiations, and will be sensitive to how they evolve.
Finally this is an interview from earlier today, for what it is worth and for those that have not seen it.
be in a constant state of alert for risks emerging in the financial shadows, which could trip up regulators and the financial system. In other words, regulatory fine-tuning could become the rule, not the exception. In this world, macro-prudential policy to lean against the financial cycle could become more, not less, important over time. With more risk residing on non-bank balance sheets that are marked-to-market, it is possible that cycles in financial assets would be amplified, not dampened, relative to the old world. Their transmission to the wider economy may also be more potent and frequent. The demands on macro-prudential policy, to stabilise these financial fluctuations and hence the macro-economy, could thereby grow.
In this world, central banks’ operational policies would be likely to remain expansive. Non-bank counterparties would grow in importance, not shrink. So too, potentially, would more exotic forms of collateral taken in central banks’ operations. Market-making, in a wider class of financial instruments, could become a more standard part of the central bank toolkit, to mitigate the effects of temporary market illiquidity droughts in the non-bank sector.” (http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Documents/speeches/2014/speech751.pdf)
b) The political road map
The political backdrop is very difficult to second guess.
Domestically, the ‘bookies’ have installed Boris Johnson as favourite to succeed Cameron, but bookies make odds on the basis of the weight of money flows (i.e. book risk), it is not therefore a mathematical probability, but rather more akin to hedging exposure. Johnson certainly has the ego and the ambition, but has a significant number of detractors. Some effort will have to be made to mend the damage inflicted by the Tory party divides during the referendum. Theresa May, who kept her head ‘below the parapet’ during the referendum, appears to be best placed to offer herself as the re-unifying candidate, particularly if she were to select a ‘Leave’ protagonist for the position of Chancellor of the Exchequer (Finance Minister). The outcome may also be influenced by the extent of Labour Party disarray and divisions, with a challenge to Mr Corbyn as leader of the Parliamentary Labour Party (N.B. not the overall party) mooted for Monday/Tuesday, which the more Machiavellian members of the Tories might seek to exploit.
The EU picture is as, if not more complex. Spain’s general election on Sunday will be closely watched, and doubtless over-analysed in terms of what it implies in broader terms for the future of the EU and Eurozone. But with no disrespect meant to the people of Spain, it is developments in the larger founding members of the Common Market – France, Germany and Italy – which will be decisive. Italy faces its referendum on major constitutional reform (‘Italicum’) in October, on which PM Renzi’s future hangs, with the Lega Nord also calling for a UK style in/out referendum, and the politically maturing 5* Movement (aka M5S) having scored major victories in the recent municipal elections. The precarious position of public sector finances without the prospect of a relatively stable govt, and the acutely woeful state of Italian bank balance sheets are the ticking time bombs, if Renzi were to be unseated. However the biggest risk lie with France and Germany, whose often diametrically opposed views about the future of the Eurozone and the EU, and accompanying generally unspoken distrust, have spawned much of the gridlock and ugly compromises, which have seriously undermined Eurozone/EU policy making for the past 20 years. French presidential elections are due for 2017 and a German general election by October 2017. If Article 50 negotiations are to be speeded up, then a conclusion will have to be reached well in advance (seemingly improbable), or only after both have concluded. Initial reactions from the unpopular and domestically very beleaguered M Hollande appeared to put the onus on Germany to get the EU/Eurozone onto a ‘more even keel’, while Frau Merkel voiced non-confrontational platitudes, which had all the hallmarks of Merkel’s character typical over thought and tortured indecision.
c) Economic Outlook
The UK economy has performed much better in Q2, both relative to Q1 and above all proved to be more robust than the vast majority of forecasters had been projecting, both thanks to solid consumer spending, as well as a pick-up in the goods producing sector, ironically in no small part due to better EU / Eurozone demand. While there is always talk that a weaker GBP , above all vs. the EUR, should provide a boost to export demand, the facts suggest otherwise. The ‘boost’ from the 2008/09 GBP slide saw the Current Account deficit widen to a post WWII record of 7.0%. As with Germany, the history of the post Bretton Woods era underlines that export demand has proved rather inelastic and unresponsive to local currency moves, while inflation has been far more sensitive to the sharp FX moves, above all sustained weakness vs. the USD. Major Business Investment decisions will inevitably be hampered by the Article 50 negotiations, and will be sensitive to how they evolve.
Finally this is an interview from earlier today, for what it is worth and for those that have not seen it.
Last edited:
Dentalfloss
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2050 area holding...now what ??
Dentalfloss
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holiday money
eurgbp
3 years of data
eurgbp
3 years of data
Dentalfloss
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holiday money testing the rez area
Dentalfloss
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looks like 8200/round is the number
lets see what happens
Faliraki more expensive now....lol
lets see what happens
Faliraki more expensive now....lol
Atilla
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Dentalfloss
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Dentalfloss
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spx since 1st February
4 hour data
4 hour data
Dentalfloss
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lookin like a definite top is in
O column with 24
no vertical count /down is activated as yet...on these inputs
2010
2020
2030 supp areas
2010/close starts gettin nasty and activates that downside count
expect messing in 2010 area...2020 is a good supp area
2050 res/red
if 2010 becomes res..then really nasty stuff
O column with 24
no vertical count /down is activated as yet...on these inputs
2010
2020
2030 supp areas
2010/close starts gettin nasty and activates that downside count
expect messing in 2010 area...2020 is a good supp area
2050 res/red
if 2010 becomes res..then really nasty stuff
Dentalfloss
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in a nutshell
2050 supp..bulls happy
2020 res and bears happy
all areas.
lets see what happens
corresponds with dax supp areas posted
2050 supp..bulls happy
2020 res and bears happy
all areas.
lets see what happens
corresponds with dax supp areas posted
Dentalfloss
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dax
supp at 9450-9485 area/green trendline
9500/round
9610 first test of res
then 9650 and 9700
9800 is a big res area
if 9450 area becomes rez ..then bears happy
then down to 9250 area
supp at 9450-9485 area/green trendline
9500/round
9610 first test of res
then 9650 and 9700
9800 is a big res area
if 9450 area becomes rez ..then bears happy
then down to 9250 area
Last edited:
Dentalfloss
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Earnings and NFP comin up
Dentalfloss
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Interest rates down...asset pricés up
Lets IF stocks get bought
Lets IF stocks get bought
Atilla
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Bargain hunting probably started. Looking for high yield shares, defensive stocks to counter uncertainty in markets I'd say.
Risk averse until some common sense prevails with clarity on way forward.
