Fed high wire act looks increasingly hazardous
By Gerard Baker
RARELY in the annals of human history has inaction been so widely anticipated or so potentially consequential as yesterday’s decision by the US Federal Reserve to leave interest rates unchanged.
The Fed’s pass, after 17 straight meetings with a rate increase, comes as fears are mounting that the central bank may already have raised interest rates too far and tipped the US economy into recession.
After five years of robust growth following a brief downturn in 2001, the economy’s pace has decelerated sharply in the past few months, caused in part by the central bank’s tightening that began two years ago.
In the three months to June, gross domestic product grew at an annual rate of just 2.5 per cent, down from a 5.6 per cent pace in the first quarter. And in July almost all the most important economic indicators pointed to a further slowing. The housing market, the driver of much of the growth in the past few years, seems to be in full retreat, with prices falling in some areas and housing starts declining sharply.
Consumers have been relying on the steep increases in their housing equity in the past five years to keep up their frenetic pace of spending. But with prices now flat or falling and mortgage rates moving higher, they will need to increase their savings and curtail consumption. Business investment is also weakening, and high oil prices continue to crimp confidence and spending of both consumers and corporations.
Yet the Fed’s decision to leave rates unchanged does not necessarily mean its long period of tightening policy has ended. Indeed, the Fed’s dilemma is that, even as its rate increases have dampened demand, inflation has been accelerating.
In June, headline consumer price inflation was 4.3 per cent annually, its highest in more than a decade. Core inflation, excluding volatile food and energy costs, was 2.6 per cent — above the top end of the Fed’s comfort range, and still rising.
The new chairman, Ben Bernanke, who succeeded Alan Greenspan just six months ago, is eager to demonstrate his inflation–fighting credentials, the most important weapon a central banker has.
Making the Fed’s task especially difficult is the nagging concern that, in recent historical terms, monetary policy may still be reasonably accommodative.
The real fed funds rate — the difference between the headline figure and the rate of core consumer price inflation — is still only about 2.5 per cent. In the past that would have been considered nothing like high enough to restrain inflation — nor to induce a recession.
A year before the 1990-91 recession, for example, the real fed funds rate was just over 5 per cent. Twelve months before the brief 2001 recession, the real rate was a little under 4 per cent.
It is possible that the economy these days is more sensitive to short-term interest rates and that they do not need to be as high as they were in the past to restrain prices. It is also worth noting that inflation, though rising, is starting from a much lower base than in the past in the current cycle.
The Fed’s hope — and its critics’ fear — rests in the knowledge that monetary policy works with a lag. Interest rate changes today will not fully affect output and demand in the economy for about a year. That means that the Fed’s rate increases over the past year should squeeze inflation back to a more tolerable level in the next one. But declines in inflation generally only follow economic slowdowns — and growth is now so weak that the further squeeze expected in the next year might tip over into an outright recession.
Mr Bernanke and his colleagues believe they have read the economy just right, pushing rates to a point that will slow the economy enough to bring down inflation without causing a full-blown economic crash.
But it’s a very thin wire to tread, one that seems to be getting thinner by the week. If they fall off it on either side, the consequences for the US — and for them — will be severe.