bbmac
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A conversation I had with another trader yesterday reminded me of a story from which there are interesting questions that arise. I'll briefly recount the story before posing the questions.
I knew of a trader who thought he had found the goose that laid the golden egg. He had devised a trading edge (essentially a set and foreget B/O system) that when back tested performed well over what he reasonably thought was an extensive and representative sample. Yes there were losers but the expectancy was positive and there seemed every reason to go live with it and to leverage up aggressively. And so he did and for some time all went well. His aggressive use of leverage and compounding of retained gains made for an impressive account gain. He was not just leveraging proportionate to the retained gains but increasing leverage (position sizes) as the live results seemed to bear out the back test. Then distsater struck, a run of consecutive losses so severe that it resulted in him abandoning the trading edge. This run of losses was bad enough on it's own but was made worse by the increasingly larger position sizes such that at more sensible position sizes commensurate with the historical strike rate, the resulting drawdown on a/c might have been easier to live with but because of the aformenetioned it was, from memory, even aftyer redusing position sizes following the first detsabilising drawadown in excess of -60% at which point live trading stopped. His monitoring of the edge therefater showed that it would have crashed and burned totally and fairly quickly.
The original money management was I imagine based on the back test but I have no idea whether this took into account the most likely size of a long consecutive losing run- should it occur or indeed the probability of it occurring as oppossed to what had occurred. This is an important distinction It seemed to me that whilst the possibility was entertained the backtest had shown that it was not a high probability.
As the origantor acknowledged, there was one of the mistakes, the historical evidence showed that such a detstabilising consecutive losing run was a possibility but had not occurred such for it to be considered improbable in the future. A sample of data in the past can only point to what happened in the past but the possibility of a destabilising event remains howsoever improbable based only on historical data.
Clearly the other main mistake was the over leverage such that when the improbable (based on historical data) did occur it caused losses that detsabilised him and his ability to carry on. nIe his management of h=the trading edge exposed him to an unsees set of circumstances that he had no prior knowledge of how he would react to..In the evnt they were sufficiently detsabilising to warrent his abandonment of the Trading Edge.
Ther third mistake was that effectively the same bet was placed across correlated instruments so that instead of hedging the risk, the same bet was being placed that assisted in magnifying the losses.
So the questions are, and there may be more;
a. Do you know the probability of a consecutive losing run of trades at your strike rate, over and above that that has been experienced in a back or forward (live trading) sample ?
b. Is your money management such that if the worst should happen it doesn't expose you to any destabilising losses ?
c. Do you increase your position sizes in winning runs or decrease them in losing runs ? or any other methodology in this respect ?
Discuss.
I knew of a trader who thought he had found the goose that laid the golden egg. He had devised a trading edge (essentially a set and foreget B/O system) that when back tested performed well over what he reasonably thought was an extensive and representative sample. Yes there were losers but the expectancy was positive and there seemed every reason to go live with it and to leverage up aggressively. And so he did and for some time all went well. His aggressive use of leverage and compounding of retained gains made for an impressive account gain. He was not just leveraging proportionate to the retained gains but increasing leverage (position sizes) as the live results seemed to bear out the back test. Then distsater struck, a run of consecutive losses so severe that it resulted in him abandoning the trading edge. This run of losses was bad enough on it's own but was made worse by the increasingly larger position sizes such that at more sensible position sizes commensurate with the historical strike rate, the resulting drawdown on a/c might have been easier to live with but because of the aformenetioned it was, from memory, even aftyer redusing position sizes following the first detsabilising drawadown in excess of -60% at which point live trading stopped. His monitoring of the edge therefater showed that it would have crashed and burned totally and fairly quickly.
The original money management was I imagine based on the back test but I have no idea whether this took into account the most likely size of a long consecutive losing run- should it occur or indeed the probability of it occurring as oppossed to what had occurred. This is an important distinction It seemed to me that whilst the possibility was entertained the backtest had shown that it was not a high probability.
As the origantor acknowledged, there was one of the mistakes, the historical evidence showed that such a detstabilising consecutive losing run was a possibility but had not occurred such for it to be considered improbable in the future. A sample of data in the past can only point to what happened in the past but the possibility of a destabilising event remains howsoever improbable based only on historical data.
Clearly the other main mistake was the over leverage such that when the improbable (based on historical data) did occur it caused losses that detsabilised him and his ability to carry on. nIe his management of h=the trading edge exposed him to an unsees set of circumstances that he had no prior knowledge of how he would react to..In the evnt they were sufficiently detsabilising to warrent his abandonment of the Trading Edge.
Ther third mistake was that effectively the same bet was placed across correlated instruments so that instead of hedging the risk, the same bet was being placed that assisted in magnifying the losses.
So the questions are, and there may be more;
a. Do you know the probability of a consecutive losing run of trades at your strike rate, over and above that that has been experienced in a back or forward (live trading) sample ?
b. Is your money management such that if the worst should happen it doesn't expose you to any destabilising losses ?
c. Do you increase your position sizes in winning runs or decrease them in losing runs ? or any other methodology in this respect ?
Discuss.
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